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ALGORITHMIC ENTITIES
LYNN M. LOPUCKI*
ABSTRACT

In a 2014 article, Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that
anyone can confer legal personhood on an autonomous computer algorithm
by putting it in control of a limited liability company. Bayern’s
demonstration coincided with the development of “autonomous” online
businesses that operate independently of their human owners—accepting
payments in online currencies and contracting with human agents to
perform the off-line aspects of their businesses. About the same time,
leading technologists Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Stephen Hawking said that
they regard human-level artificial intelligence as an existential threat to the
human race.
This Article argues that algorithmic entities—legal entities that
have no human controllers—greatly exacerbate the threat of artificial
intelligence. Algorithmic entities are likely to prosper first and most in
criminal, terrorist, and other anti-social activities because that is where
they have their greatest comparative advantage over human-controlled
entities. Control of legal entities will contribute to the threat algorithms
pose by providing them with identities. Those identities will enable them to
conceal their algorithmic natures while they participate in commerce,
accumulate wealth, and carry out anti-social activities.
Four aspects of corporate law make the human race vulnerable to
the threat of algorithmic entities. First, algorithms can lawfully have
exclusive control of not just American LLC’s but also a large majority of
the entity forms in most countries. Second, entities can change regulatory
regimes quickly and easily through migration. Third, governments—
particularly in the United States—lack the ability to determine who controls
the entities they charter and so cannot determine which have non-human
controllers. Lastly, corporate charter competition, combined with ease of
entity migration, makes it virtually impossible for any government to
regulate algorithmic control of entities.
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I keep sounding the alarm bell but until people see robots going down the
street killing people, they don’t know how to react. . . . By the time we are
reactive in AI regulation, it’s too late. . . . AI is a fundamental existential
risk to human civilization.— Elon Musk1
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Yale law professor Roberta Romano characterized state
government competition to sell corporate charters as the “genius of
American corporate law.”2 Although that view is not without detractors,3 it
is dominant in academia.4 In recent years, not even the competition’s
harshest critics call for its end.5 Despite a recent corporate governance
scandal and a financial crisis largely attributed to failures in corporate law,
the U.S. government has allowed the competition to continue unabated.
As this Article will show, charter competition generates systemic risk
while impairing the political system’s ability to address the effects should
that risk resolve unfavorably. Scholars have failed to notice because they
assume that the competition affects only the corporation’s “internal
affairs”—by which they mean the relationships among the corporation and

1. CNBC, Elon Musk Issues Yet Another Warning Against Runaway Artificial Intelligence,
YOUTUBE (July 17, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdTTeR4TyMc.
2. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 149 (1993) (“Competition for
incorporation revenues makes U.S. states sensitive to investor concerns: such competition is the genius
of American corporate law.”); id. at 148 (“[S]tate competition has produced innovative corporation
codes that quickly respond to changing market conditions and firm demands.”).
3. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules,
and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 625 (2002)
(“[J]urisdictional competition for corporate charters is highly imperfect. Far from resembling textbook
competition among rival firms, the jurisdictional competition for corporate charters is highly
oligopolistic. One competitor, Delaware, dominates the competition.”); see generally Lynn M. LoPucki,
Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing that the competition
prevents corporate regulation and is beyond democratic control).
4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect
Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1169 (1999) (“[S]cholars since Cary have largely
taken a favorable view of state competition for corporate charters.”). E.g., Mitchell A. Kane & Edward
B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1238
n.15 (2008) (“For the purposes of this Article, we assume that charter competition leads to more valuable
firms.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy,
72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 510 (1994) (claiming that “charter competition encourages states to regulate
corporate law in a relatively efficient fashion” “appears to be the case”); Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng,
Chinese Unbridled Incorporation Competition: The Reality of Political Economy and Competition for
Corporate Charters as a Replacement, 44 HONG KONG L.J. 247, 248 (2014) (“Charter competition in
American states is an outstanding example of a successful proactive strategy.”).
5. E.g., Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 4, at 1199 (“This Article has sought to highlight the problems
involved in state competition for corporate charters.”).
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its officers, directors, and shareholders.6 If that were true, the competition
would be of less concern because the affected parties would be volunteers.7
But in reality, entity law does not affect merely that narrow group of
stakeholders. It also determines who can inhabit entities, what information
government and the public will have about them, and how effectively
governments can police their conduct.
Elsewhere, I have argued that charter competition’s function is to
deregulate corporations and insulate that deregulation from democratic
control.8 That is, in a system in which corporations do not want regulation
at all and can choose their regulators, the race will be neither to the top nor
the bottom. The race will be to no meaningful regulation at all.9
Disabling regulation enables legitimate businesses. But it also enables
everyone who uses entities, including terrorists, organized criminals, money
launderers, corrupt public officials, and child pornographers.10 In addition,
as this Article explores, deregulation may soon enable artificial
intelligence—with possibly catastrophic consequences.
In two recent articles, Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that anyone
can confer legal personhood on an autonomous computer algorithm merely
by putting it in control of a limited liability company (LLC).11 The algorithm
can exercise the rights of the entity, making them effectively rights of the
algorithm.
The rights of such an algorithmic entity (AE) would include the rights to

6. E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 679, 681 (2002) (“[T]he legal domicile affects how corporate disputes between directors and
shareholders are resolved—and nothing else.”); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem
of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 597 (2016) (“Corporate
governance regulation concerns the balance of power between its shareholders, its officers, and its
directors, and commonly falls within the rubric understood as the corporation’s ‘internal affairs.’ . . .
Other forms of regulation are generally understood to be external to the corporation . . . .”).
7. See ROMANO, supra note 2, at 85 (“The enabling approach is a function of the contractual nature
of the corporation. Participation in a firm is voluntary . . . .”).
8. LoPucki, supra note 3, at 4 (“My analysis concludes that the system’s principal effects are to
deregulate corporations and shield them from the democratic re-imposition of regulation.”).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Examining State Business Incorporation Practices: A Discussion of the Incorporation
Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act: Hearing on S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 192 (June 18, 2009) (written testimony of
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney for New York County, State of New York (saying in testimony
regarding state business incorporation practices “[s]ystems promoting opacity and secrecy are the best
friend of the money launderer, the child pornographer, the tax cheat, the fraudster, the corrupt politician,
and indeed, the financier of networks of terror”)).
11. Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business Entity Law for the Regulation of
Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 104 n.43 (2015) [hereinafter Bayern, Entity Law];
Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U.
L. REV. 1485, 1496–97 (2014) [hereinafter Bayern, Wealthy Software].
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privacy,12 to own property, to enter into contracts, to be represented by
counsel, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure,13 to equal
protection of the laws,14 to speak freely, and to spend money on political
campaigns.15 Once an algorithm had such rights, Bayern observed, it would
also have the power to confer equivalent rights on other algorithms by
forming additional entities and putting those algorithms in control of them.16
To achieve autonomy, AEs would have to be able to generate their own
incomes. But artificial intelligence researchers may already have solved that
problem. Currently available algorithms can defeat the best human players
of chess, Jeopardy!,17 and Go.18 Most commentators believe that algorithms
with the same level of technological sophistication can run profitable
businesses. Commentators have proposed electronic data storage,19 bike
rental,20 online gambling,21 vending machines,22 and blockchain-based
competitors to Uber and Airbnb.23 Several start-up companies are building
accounting tools on blockchain technology to support the anticipated
autonomous online businesses.24
Unfortunately, AEs’ greatest comparative advantage would be in
criminal enterprise. Because they lack human bodies, AEs are harder to

12. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (“Dow plainly has a reasonable,
legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered buildings, and it is
equally clear that expectation is one society is prepared to observe.”).
13. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 44 (1906).
14. Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (noting that the Court agreed
that the Equal Protection Clause applied to corporations).
15. Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
16. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 104 (advocating a model under which “legal personhood
is like fire: it can be granted by anyone who already has it”).
17. E.g., John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html?pagewanted=all [https:
//perma.cc/MS3W-XNGD] (describing Watson’s win over two Jeopardy! experts).
18. E.g., Cade Metz, In a Huge Breakthrough, Google’s AI Beats a Top Player at the Game of Go,
WIRED (Jan. 27, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/in-a-huge-breakthrough-googles-aibeats-a-top-player-at-the-game-of-go/ [https://perma.cc/H2VS-T5MZ].
19. StorJ, and Bitcoin autonomous agents, RANDOM BLATHERINGS BY JEFF (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://garzikrants.blogspot.com/2013/01/storj-and-bitcoin-autonomous-agents.html
[https://perma.cc/2H3B-ULGH] (quoting a forum post by Gregory Maxwell (gmaxwell) describing a
“drop-box style file service with pay per use via bitcoin”).
20. David Z. Morris, RoboCorp, AERON ESSAYS (Jan. 25, 2015), https://aeon.co/essays/are-weready-for-companies-that-run-themselves [https://perma.cc/EXV8-VVMZ] (using a hypothetical bike
rental business as an illustration).
21. DJ Pangburn, The Humans Who Dream of Companies That Won’t Need Us, FAST COMPANY
(June 19, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3047462/the-humans-who-dream-of-companies-thatwont-need-them [https://perma.cc/ZGR4-QZ74].
22. Bayern, Wealthy Software, supra note 11, at 1494 (using a vending machine business as an
example).
23. Pangburn, supra note 21.
24. Id. (naming Ethereum, New Economy Movement, Nxt, and Mastercoin (now Omni Layer)).
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catch and impossible to punish. AEs need not fear death or capture.25 They
can replicate themselves without ego and sacrifice themselves without
motive. They need not recoil at the necessity to do violence to humans.26
In apparent recognition of these unique qualities, one commentator has
proposed assassination brokering as a possible AE service line.27 It is not
hard to imagine an AE—the identity and location of its autonomous
algorithm shielded by an anonymous LLC—matching human assassins with
customers and laundering its fees through layers of shell entities using the
wide variety of anonymous payments systems currently in development.
Things might get even worse. Some of the world’s wealthiest and most
powerful people and companies are racing to create the smartest artificial
intelligence.28 They include Google, Facebook, IBM, Elon Musk, and
Microsoft.29 In a recent survey of one hundred seventy industry experts, the
median expert expected human-level artificial intelligence by 204030 and 90
percent expected it by 2075.31
Ironically, even many of the humans who are racing to achieve superhuman intelligence expect that achievement to turn out badly for the human
race. Tech billionaire Elon Musk said that “[w]ith artificial intelligence we
are summoning the demon”32 and characterized it as “the most serious threat

25. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 28 (2012),
http:// www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf [https://perma .cc/V2344A7F] [hereinafter LOSING HUMANITY] (Fully autonomous weapons “would not be inhibited by the
desire for self-preservation. They would not be influenced by emotions such as anger or fear.”).
26. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges,
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 367 (2016) (“[A]n AI’s objectives are
determined by its initial programming. Even if that initial programming permits or encourages the AI to
alter its objectives based on subsequent experiences, those alterations will occur in accordance with the
dictates of the initial programming.”).
27. Morris, supra note 20 (“Bitcoin insiders . . . postulate the quite literal ‘killer app’ for
[distributed autonomous corporations]–a distributed assassination brokerage.”); id. (“[A] spokesman for
Ethereum . . . cited WikiLeaks as one of the best examples of a service that could benefit from operating
as a [distributed autonomous corporation] . . . .”).
28. Cade Metz, Google’s Go Victory is Just a Glimpse of How Powerful AI Will Be, WIRED( Jan.
29, 2016) , https://www.wired.com/2016/01/googles-go-victory-is-just-a-glimpse-of-how-powerful-aiwill-be/ [https://perma.cc/A9QJ-QXRC] (“The effort to create the smartest AI has truly become a race,
and the contestants are among the most powerful and wealthy people on the planet.”); Scherer, supra
note 26, at 374 (“The commercial potential of AI has already led to a veritable AI arms race as large
companies have moved to invest heavily in AI projects.”).
29. Metz, supra note 28.
30. Vincent C. Müller & Nick Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of
Expert Opinion, in FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 5 (Vincent C. Müller ed.,
2016).
31. Id. at 1.
32. Samuel Gibbs, Elon Musk: Artificial Intelligence Is Our Biggest Existential Threat, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 27, 2014, 6:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/27/elon-musk-artificialintelligence-ai-biggest-existential-threat [https://perma.cc/HR7Z-L449] (“I think we should be very
careful about artificial intelligence. If I had to guess at what our biggest existential threat is, it’s probably
that.”).
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to the survival of the human race.”33 Bill Gates said he “agree[d] with Elon
Musk and some others on this and [did]n’t understand why some people are
not concerned.”34 Stephen Hawking said that “the development of full
artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.”35 Thirty-one
percent of a group of artificial intelligence experts surveyed predicted that
the development of human-level intelligence would turn out to be “bad” or
“[e]xtremely bad” for humanity.36 Eighteen percent of those expected
“[e]xtremely bad,” which was defined for purposes of the study as an
“existential catastrophe.”37
Artificial intelligence takeover is a common theme of novels and films.38
But neither science fiction nor the academic literature has seriously
undertaken to explain the mechanisms by which artificial intelligence would
gain control.39 This Article begins that discussion by exploring the enabling
role that artificial legal entities might play. Essentially, that role is to provide
an interface between algorithms and humans that allows the algorithms to
transact with humans at the same time that the entities shield the algorithms
from human regulation. The effect is to confer an identity on the algorithm,
enhance its access to legitimate commerce, and thereby increase its ability
to inflict damage.
Anonymity illustrates the depth of the problem. Most state governments
sell anonymous entities.40 The assurance of anonymity is perfect. Because

33. Id.
34. In a Reddit post, Gates wrote:
I am in the camp that is concerned about super intelligence. First the machines will do a lot of
jobs for us and not be super intelligent. That should be positive if we manage it well . . . A few
decades after that though the intelligence is strong enough to be a concern. I agree with Elon
Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.
Eric Mack, Bill Gates Says You Should Worry About Artificial Intelligence, FORBES, Jan. 28, 2015.
35. Andrew Griffin, Stephen Hawking: AI Could Be the End of Humanity, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 2,
2014.
36. Müller & Bostrom, supra note 30, at 12. The number of respondents was 170 out of 549. Id. at
4.
37. Id. at 12.
38. E.g., A.I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Warner Bros. 2001) (humans extinct and replaced by
artificial intelligence); THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999) (artificial intelligence keeps humans in coffinsize pods); THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale 1984) (artificial intelligence called Skynet threatens nuclear
holocaust); Jack Williamson, With Folded Hands . . . , ASTOUNDING SCIENCE FICTION, July 1947, at 6
(artificial intelligence lobotomizes humans to make them happy).
39. But see The Animatrix, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Animatrix#.22The_S
econd_Renaissance_Part_I.22 [https://perma.cc/GG4N-UUZR] (last visited Oct. 10, 2017) (“The
surviving robots leave in a mass exodus with the aid of their human allies and build their own new nation
in central Saudi Arabia (according to narration, ‘the cradle of civilization’).”).
40. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-376, COMPANY FORMATIONS: MINIMAL
OWNERSHIP INFORMATION IS COLLECTED AND AVAILABLE 13 (2006) (“Most states do not require
ownership information at the time a company is formed, and while most states require corporations and
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the charter-issuing governments do not obtain the purchasers’ identities,
those governments cannot reveal them, even to police and prosecutors.
Buyers can use these anonymous entities to operate businesses or hold
property anonymously almost anywhere in the world. In some U.S. markets,
anonymous LLC ownership of expensive housing has become the norm,41
and anonymous LLCs sometimes flaunt their ability to disregard the law.42
The largest and most powerful countries, including the United States,
have agreed that the sale of anonymous entities should end. As members of
the Financial Action Task Force, the United States and thirty-six other
nations have agreed that, to combat terrorism, crime, and money laundering,
“[c]ountries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely
information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that
can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities.”43
But even in such compelling circumstances, neither the United States nor
most of the other concurring nations have been able to enact legislation
requiring even the first step in that process: self-identification of the humans
who control each entity. Legislation that would require that step has been
pending in the United States Congress for nine years. That legislation does
not require that the controllers provide any documentary proof of their
claimed identities, that the government make any effort to determine
whether the documents are genuine, or that any information be made public.
Despite its timidity, the legislation is given little chance of passage.44
Instead, the entity system is racing in the opposite direction.45
Governments are locked in a competition to make the entities they sell more
attractive to potential buyers, and that competition is spreading throughout
the world.46 Nearly all competing governments pursue the same strategy:
impose less regulation and confer more benefits on the entity’s owners and
controllers.

LLCs to file annual or biennial reports, few states require ownership information on these reports.”).
41. Louise Story, A Mansion, a Shell Company and Resentment in Bel Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2015 (“Shell companies were used in three-quarters of purchases of over $5 million in Los Angeles over
the last three years, a higher rate even than the roughly 55 percent in New York . . . .”).
42. Id. (describing an anonymous LLC’s construction of a $100 million home in blatant violation
of numerous building regulations).
43. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY
LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS,
22
(FEB.
2012)
(last
updated
Oct.
2016),
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fa
tf/.../recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf [hereinafter FATF RECOMMENDATIONS]
(recommendation 24).
44. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
45. E.g., Federico M. Mucciarelli, The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of
Reincorporations in the U.S. and the EU, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421, 467 (2012) (“EU law is the
driver of the evolution of Member States’ laws toward a more liberal approach to corporate mobility.”).
46. See, e.g., Weng, supra note 4 (advocating charter competition for China).
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Three fundamental principles frame that competition. First, an entity can
incorporate anywhere, regardless of the location of its operations. Second,
an entity chartered in one jurisdiction can do business in virtually any other
jurisdiction.47 Third, while operating in those other jurisdictions, the entity
continues to be governed by the entity law under which it was formed.48
Those principles are deeply embedded, not only in laws, constitutions, and
treaties, but also in physical systems and business operations, throughout
the world.49 The effect is that almost regardless of where it will operate, an
entity can choose the law that will regulate it from among the entity laws of
nearly the entire world.50
Chartering artificial entities is a highly profitable business. Virtually
every government sells charters, and hundreds of governments at the
national or local level actively compete for the sales in a multi-billion dollar
market.51 Many of the competing governments are in small states or
countries where the revenues from entity sales provide a substantial portion
of all government revenues.52 For example, in 2005, more than a quarter of
Delaware’s revenues were from entity sales.53 Ending the competition might

47. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459; Scott
FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions on Incorporation, Good Standing, and Qualification
to Do Business, 41 BUS. LAW. 461, 479 (1986) (“Qualification usually can be accomplished by simply
filing and paying a fee.”).
48. Mucciarelli, supra note 45, at 465 (“Indeed, as a basic principle, employee participation is
governed by the law of the state where the registered office is located after the reincorporation by way
of cross-border merger.”); e.g., Directive 2007/36, art. 1, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 July 2007 on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies, 2007 O.J. (L
184) 17 (“The Member State competent to regulate matters covered in this Directive shall be the Member
State in which the company has its registered office, and references to the ‘applicable law’ are references
to the law of that Member State.”).
49. The principles to which I refer are system principles. They transcend legal principles.
[Legal] systems operate according to basic principles that are few in number and remain stable
over time. Participants in the systems may or may not be conscious of the principles they
follow. Sometimes the principles will be expressed in maxims, adages, or black letter rules of
law. But just as often they are so deeply embedded in the systems and the minds of participants
that they go virtually unnoticed.
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1996).
50. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 2, at 1 (“Firms . . . can . . . seek the state whose code best
matches their needs.”).
51. Comprehensive data are not available on either the number of entities existing or the
government revenues generated. EconStats provides data from 2005 on seventy countries that account
for more than 42 million incorporations. ECONSTATS, http://www.econstats.com/wdi/wdiv_494.htm
[http://perma.cc/X4NU-JP75]. I derived this figure by totaling the numbers reported on the spreadsheet
for that year.
52. ROMANO, supra note 2, at 121 (“Franchise fee revenues are an insignificant percentage of a
national government’s budget. Hence, such a government is far less motivated than a small state, such
as Delaware, to be responsive to firms.”).
53. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 53 (2005) (stating that corporate filing fees and franchise taxes were 27
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have serious fiscal consequences for some of those governments. The
competing governments consistently resist reform.
Reform of the entity system will also meet resistance from at least three
other sources. First, as the release of the Panama Papers showed, a ban on
anonymous entities would adversely affect the interests of tax evaders,
terrorists, corrupt public officials, drug cartels, money launderers, and other
criminals.54 These entities will exercise their considerable influence in
opposition. Second, privacy advocates oppose disclosure of the human
owners’ and controllers’ identities, even to the government.55 Third,
ideological support for “regulatory competition” in the entity market is
strong. As a Delaware official argued in opposition to entity disclosure, “We
have a system that is the greatest creator of wealth in the history of the
world. We will not support any changes that change the friendliness of
American business and close our doors to capital formation and the ease of
doing business.”56 Given the forces in opposition, reform of the entity
chartering system seems unlikely.
Part I of this Article considers how and why humans might create AEs
and exclude themselves from control of their creations. Section A explains
how algorithms can inhabit entities. Section B explores the motives that
might drive humans to initiate AEs. Section C explains why AEs are a
greater threat than algorithms operating without entities. Part II explores
three challenges to the ability of humans to maintain control over AEs.
Section A demonstrates the ability of AEs to inhabit nearly any entity type.
Section B does the same with respect to AE mobility across entity types and
jurisdictional borders. Section C explains the difficulty of detecting AEs in
the present, low-disclosure legal environment. Part III describes the changes
in the international entity system that would be necessary to regulate AEs,
explains the difficulty of making those changes, and speculates on the role
that AEs themselves might play in opposition. Part IV concludes that
effective reform requires that governments end the competition to sell

percent of Delaware’s budget in 2004).
54. Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption,
Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists (Apr. 3, 2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403panama-papers-global-overview.html [http://perma.cc/KS86-59F8].
55. See, e.g., Shelby Emmett, Beneficial Ownership Disclosure: A Huge Donor Disclosure Threat,
AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.alec.org/article
/beneficial-ownership-disclosure-a-huge-donor-disclosure-threat/ (“In the name of fighting terrorists
and criminals these bills will expose millions of law abiding individuals to a massive government data
collection that undermines their personal privacy and that of anyone even loosely connected to an entity
they create.”).
56. Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven .html
[https://perma.cc/V4ZZ-BSTY].
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charters. Absent such drastic reform, the entity system may vastly multiply
the risk of existential catastrophe posed by artificial intelligence.
I. THE NATURE OF ALGORITHMIC ENTITIES
A legal entity is anyone or anything the law recognizes as a legal actor.
In addition to human beings, entities include corporations, partnerships,
limited liability companies (LLCs), trusts, estates, government agencies,
and many other types. Entities do not include ships,57 animals,58 trees,59
trademarks,60 or corporate groups,61 to name just a few. Entities can own
property, enter into contracts, sue, and be sued.
An entity is “algorithmic” if an algorithm controls it. An algorithm is a
set of decision-making rules. The relevant algorithms run on computers.
They are programs—artificial intelligences—that make and execute
decisions in response to external circumstances. Algorithms are not entities;
they are property.
For the purposes of this Article, an algorithm controls an entity only if
the algorithm makes the entity’s decisions without human participation.
That a human created the algorithm does not disqualify the algorithm from
status as a controller, provided that the human no longer has the ability to
modify the algorithm.
An entity is “autonomous” if the entity controls itself, as opposed to
being controlled by owners or members. All algorithmic entities are
autonomous by definition. But not all autonomous entities are algorithmic.
For example, a nonprofit corporation may have no shareholders or
members.62 The members of the board of directors make decisions for such

57. Michal Chwedczuk, Analysis of the Legal Status of Unmanned Commercial Vessels in U.S.
Admiralty and Maritime Law, 47 J. MAR. L. & COM. 123, 163 (2016) (arguing that the law should grant
personhood to unmanned vessels directed by artificial intelligence).
58. E.g., People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249–50 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014) (“Not surprisingly, animals have never been considered persons for the purposes of
habeas corpus relief, nor have they been explicitly considered as persons or entities capable of asserting
rights for the purpose of state or federal law.”).
59. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 487 (1972).
60. Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward A Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099, 1100
(2002) (“[L]iability law recognizes no entity or actor corresponding to Mobil, Honeywell, or Price
Waterhouse.”).
61. Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 885 (2012) (“In the United States, however, there is no entity form
corresponding to the corporate group . . . .”).
62. E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 5310 (2014) (providing, with respect to nonprofit public benefit
corporations that a corporation “may admit persons to membership, as provided in its articles or bylaws,
or may provide in its articles or bylaws that it shall have no members”).
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an entity, including the selection of board members.63 Because the board is
autonomous and regarded as the physical manifestation of the entity, the
entity is regarded as autonomous.64 This Article addresses only entities that
are both autonomous and algorithmic.
Intelligence is the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills.
Artificial intelligence is a computer program—an algorithm—that has those
abilities. Although such a program is capable of gathering information and
making decisions, the law regards it as mere property. Because it lacks the
status of legal actor, the algorithm can neither own property nor legally bind
humans to carry out its decisions. Only entities can do those things.
A. Linking Algorithms and Entities
Although an algorithm has no rights of its own, Bayern has shown that
by giving an algorithm control of a legal entity, an initiator can confer on
the algorithm the ability to exercise the entity’s rights.65 Because those legal
rights are the rights of “persons,” Bayern argues that such a link confers
“personhood” on the algorithm.66
Bayern asserts that the New York Limited Liability Company Act67 and
the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA)68 permit LLCs to
exist without members. His assertion is questionable with respect to both
statutes.69 But Bayern does specify at least one chain of events that is
capable of establishing AEs under those statutes:
The proposed technique is as follows: (1) Existing person P
establishes member-managed LLCs A and B, with identical operating
agreements both providing that the entity is controlled by an

63. Id. (“In the case of a corporation which has no members, any action . . . which would otherwise
require . . . approval by the members . . . shall require only approval of the board . . . .”).
64. E.g., Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (stating that non-profit
organizations “are autonomous agents that should control their own destiny”).
65. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 101–04 (using the example of an LLC).
66. Id. at 104 (“The end result is novel legal personhood—or at least a functional analogue of it—
without any ongoing commitment by, or subservience to, a preexisting person.”).
67. Id. at 103–04.
68. Id. at 102.
69. See Matthew Scherer, Is AI Personhood Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part One:
New York), LAW AND AI (May 14, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/05/14/is-ai- personhoodalready-possible-under-current-u-s-laws-dont-count-on-it-part-one/[http://perma.cc/YFA4-5SPD]
[hereinafter Scherer, Part One] (arguing that memberless LLCs can exist only for brief periods under
New York law) ); Mathew Scherer, Is AI Personhood Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part
Two: Uniform LLC Act), LAW AND AI (May 21, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/05/21/is-aipersonhood-already-possible-under-current-u-s-laws-part-two-uniform-llc-act/ [http://perma.cc/M6BK
-UMAM] [hereinafter Scherer, Part Two] (arguing that memberless LLCs can exist only for brief periods
under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act).
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autonomous system that is not a preexisting legal person; (2) P causes
A to be admitted as a member of B and B to be admitted as a member
of A; (3) P withdraws from both entities. The result does not trigger
the law’s response to memberless entities, because what remains are
simply two entities with one member each.70
The entity pair thus formed will be referred to in this Article as an AE
“dyad.”
Once formed, AEs would not be confined to cyberspace. An AE could
act offline by contracting online with humans or robots for offline services.
Bayern uses an algorithm that operates a Bitcoin vending machine business
to illustrate:
Someone needs to install the vending machines and continuously
supply them. But from the perspective of the software operating the
network, those tasks are simply another type of input to production,
like disk space or network bandwidth. The software can pay someone
to install or stock a new vending machine, verify that the task has
been completed, and remit payment digitally using Bitcoin.71
The essential elements of a business conducted by an algorithm through
an entity are the entity, the algorithm, the computer to run it on, the internet
access, and the ability to pay for those things. Once those elements are in
place, an entity controlled by an algorithm might be virtually
indistinguishable from one controlled by humans. Either kind of entity
could contract for the services of human agents and employees. Those
agents and employees could open bank accounts, conduct interviews, meet
with customers, appear in court on the entity’s behalf, and do anything else
that might be necessary. Once an AE is up and running, profits might
provide the money necessary to continue. The AE would then be not only
autonomous, but also self-sufficient.
B. Initiating Algorithmic Entities
A simple algorithm might be sufficient to run a simple business, such as
Bayern’s vending machine operator. That algorithm could run on a
computer that cost only a few hundred dollars. Such a business might
generate sufficient revenues to become self-supporting in a matter of
months and then run for many years. But the duration of its operation would

70. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 104 n.43.
71. Bayern, Wealthy Software, supra note 11, at 1494.
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be limited by the algorithm’s inability to adapt to changing circumstances.
An algorithm sufficiently sophisticated to run a complex business and
adapt to changing circumstances would cost more. IBM developed Watson,
an artificial intelligence program that might have such capabilities, at an
estimated cost of $900 million to $1.8 billion. 72 An AE initiator would not
have to incur costs of that magnitude. The AE would require only a copy of
the software and the programming services necessary to modify its
objectives. A supercomputer capable of running a modified copy of Watson
may cost $500,000 to $1 million. Even if those costs are currently
prohibitive, they are likely to decline over time, even as the capabilities of
the hardware and software increase.
By definition, the initiator of an AE would neither own the entity nor
control it after launch. The initiator would, however, have the opportunity
to set the algorithm’s objectives prior to launch. Initiators might be willing
to contribute the funds necessary to launch AEs for a variety of reasons.
1. Terrorism. An initiator could program an AE to raise money to finance
terrorism or to directly engage in terrorist acts. It could be programmed for
genocide or general mayhem.
2. Benefits. An initiator could program an AE to provide direct benefits
to individuals, groups, or causes. For example, an AE might pay excess
funds to the initiator or to someone on whom the initiator chose to confer
that benefit. The benefits conferred could be indirect. For example, an AE
might promote or consume the initiator’s products,73 harass the initiator’s
opponents, manipulate securities prices, or provide positive or negative
reviews on the internet.
3. Impact. An initiator could program an AE to achieve some specified
impact on the world. The goals might range all of the way from traditional
philanthropy to pure maliciousness. Philanthropic AEs might provide a
more trustworthy alternative to traditional charities and foundations, which
often fail to carry out donors’ instructions.74 Alternatively, decedents might
choose to entrust AEs to apply their wealth to any purpose whatsoever—

72. 5 billion-dollar tech gambles, CNN MONEY http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2010/technolo
gy/1008/gallery.biggest_tech_gambles/3.html, Aug. 26, 2010.
73. AEs might, for example, become independent franchisees.
74. Frances H. Foster, Donor-Centered Philanthropy (unpublished manuscript 2017) (providing
examples); Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor
Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2005) (“The cat is out of the bag: Donors are fast
discovering what was once a well-kept secret in the philanthropic sector—that a gift to public charity
donated for a specific purpose and restricted to that purpose is often used by the charity for its general
operations or applied to other uses not intended by the donor.”). See generally CONTEMPORARY TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 816–48 (Susan Gary et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017) (providing an extended discussion of cases
“involv[ing] donor intent and the alleged failure by the charity to carry out that intent,” including the
high-profile Buck Trust, Barnes, Smithers, Hardt, Robertson, and Helmsley Trust cases).
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including manipulation of their descendants in ways not permitted by law,
the expression of their political views or racial prejudices, magnifying the
decedents’ places in history, or supporting causes so unpopular that the
inheritance system would not tolerate them.
4. Curiosity. An initiator might launch an AE simply out of curiosity.
Initiators have sometimes devoted substantial time and money to launch
computer viruses from which they could derive no monetary benefit.
Initiators might seek the knowledge or fame that a successful AE could
generate.
5. Liability avoidance. Initiators can limit their civil and criminal liability
for acts of their algorithms by transferring the algorithms to entities and
surrendering control at the time of the launch.75 For example, the initiator
might specify a general goal, such as maximizing financial return, and leave
it to the algorithm to decide how to do that. If the algorithm later directed
the commission of a crime, prosecutors may be unable to prove the intent
necessary to convict the initiator of that crime (as opposed to the lesser
charge of reckless initiation). Because intelligent agents act and interact in
unpredictable ways, most commentators conclude that there is a substantial
class of cases in which the initiators of intelligent agents will not be held
responsible for the agent’s actions. This conclusion is accepted in the
literature and referred to as the “accountability gap.”76 Together, these five
motivations assure that once the necessary hardware and software are
available, humans will launch AEs.
C. The Threat from Algorithm Plus Entity
Algorithmic control of a legal entity—exclusive of human control—is
the essence of an AE. Much of the danger results from that combination.
Neither an entityless algorithm nor a human-controlled algorithm presents
nearly so great a threat. Control of entities would allow algorithms to
accumulate wealth, leverage it in capital markets, and participate in the

75. The ability to do so may vary significantly by jurisdiction. For example, the German limited
liability act provides:
Shareholders who intentionally or gross negligently leave a person who may not act as director
to manage the company’s business shall be held severally and jointly liable to the company for
that damage which arises on account of the fact that this person violates the obligations which
he is under vis-à-vis the company.
See, e.g., Limited Liability Companies Act § 6(5).
76. E.g., Bert-Jaap Koops et al., Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the
Information Society?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 497, 560–61 (2010) (“The majority view in the
literature is that sooner or later, limited legal personhood with strict liability is a good solution for solving
the accountability gap.”).
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political process—without being subject to the constraints under which
humans operate.
1. The Entity’s Contribution
Algorithms that do not control entities are capable of inflicting massive
damage on social and economic systems. They could shut down human
computing, steal and release confidential information, and wreak havoc by
seizing control of the internet of things.
What they cannot do without controlling entities is to participate
effectively in legitimate economic and political activity.77 That is, an
algorithm alone could not engage in business, accumulate wealth, or deal
with people in the above-ground economy.
Consider, for example, an algorithm that seeks to accumulate resources
by encrypting humans’ data and offering to decrypt it in return for ransom
payments. The algorithm may not need an entity to commit the crime, or
even to receive the payment in bitcoin.78 But an algorithm alone could not
use the proceeds to buy or lease real property, contract with legitimate
businesses, open a bank account, sue to enforce its rights, or buy stuff on
Amazon and have it shipped. To do any of those things, the algorithm would
need an identity.
Algorithms could use fake human identities. But creating a fake human
identity requires criminal and fraudulent acts. Because a fake human
identity asserts the existence of a human who does not exist or claims the
identity of a human who does exist, a fake human identity could never be
safe from discovery. As a consequence, the algorithm could not fully rely
on it. Nor could a fake human identity be credible in the business world
without the same human’s personal appearances over time.
By contrast, an algorithm could generate any number of artificial entities
quickly and easily, without violating any law. The entities can function as
the algorithm’s identities, just as entities do for other kinds of criminals.79
Artificial entities can more easily generate credibility because they are a
form with which business people are already familiar. Artificial entities can
make their “personal” appearances through a changing array of humans
because such changes commonly occur in business entities.
Transactions in the criminal underworld are complicated, risky, and

77. I am indebted to Jason Oh for raising the issue addressed in this section.
78. See CYBER THREAT ALLIANCE, LUCRATIVE RANSOMWARE ATTACKS: ANALYSIS OF THE
CRYPTOWALL VERSION 3 THREAT (2015) (describing successful ransomware with payment through
bitcoin).
79. Shima Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 492 (2014) (“[Shell
companies] obscure true beneficial ownership to the detriment of law enforcement worldwide.”).
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inefficient. Like other criminals, criminal algorithms will want access to the
safety and efficiency of the legitimate business world. Money laundering is
the link between those two worlds,80 and entities are an essential money
laundering tool.81 Like other criminals without entities, algorithms without
entities would be confined to the underworld, unable to apply their wealth
effectively. Allowing algorithms to control entities is particularly dangerous
to society because governments lack the power to meaningfully regulate
entities.82
2. The Human-Exclusion Contribution
Bayern saw “few systematic downsides, in permitting memberless
entities that a nonhuman system might ‘inhabit’ and use as an interface to
the rest of private law.”83 He advocated “experimentation” without prior
regulation.84 The essence of his argument was that putting an algorithm in
control of an entity did not enable the algorithm to do anything it could not
do “with a single willing collaborator that is already a legal person.”85 To
put his argument another way, most artificial intelligence algorithms are
already owned by artificial entities.86 Those entities have all of the rights
and abilities that will accrue to AEs. The humans in control of those entities
can give their algorithms as much control as they choose. If the humans cede
all control, the entities are indistinguishable from AEs. Thus, Bayern
concludes, allowing AEs adds nothing to the risks from artificial
intelligence.
To the contrary, the risk to humanity from AEs is greater than the risk
from algorithms with human collaborators for at least three reasons. Entities
without human collaborators could be more ruthless, more difficult to deter,

80. Id. at 488 (“Money laundering is a multi-layered process by which terrorists hide the illegal
source or use of income and then disguise that income to make it appear legitimate.”).
81. Id. (“Shell companies are important to [the layering] stage of the [money laundering] process
because the layering transactions involve moving funds to supposedly legitimate companies.”).
82. See generally LoPucki, supra note 3 (arguing that charter competition prevents regulation).
83. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 109.
84. Id. at 110 (“[T]here are several advantages to permitting at least experimentation with
autonomous entities. The alternatives are either too slow (direct regulation by statute) or too restrictive
(no recognition at all).”).
85. Id. at 109 (“[T]he legal techniques I am describing provide little new functional capabilities;
autonomous systems already can do quite a lot, legally, with a single willing collaborator that is already
a legal person.”); id. at 107 (“Any autonomous system that desires (if it is sufficiently advanced to
experience desire)—or for which others desire—legal personhood can approximate its capabilities with
any willing human collaborator (or indeed any existing legal person that is willing).”).
86. Watson, for example, is owned by IBM Corporation. See supra note 72 and accompanying
text.
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and easier to replicate.
a. Ruthlessness
Unless explicitly or implicitly programmed to have them, AEs will lack
sympathy and empathy. Even if the AEs are fully capable of understanding
the effects of their actions on humans, they may be indifferent to those
effects. As a result, AEs will have a wider range of options available to them
than would be available to even the most morally lax human controller. An
AE could pursue its goals with utter ruthlessness. Virtually any human
controller would stop somewhere short of that, making the AE more
dangerous.
b. Lack of Deterrability
Outsiders can more easily deter a human-controlled entity than an AE.
For example, if a human-controlled entity attempts to pursue an illegal
course of action, the government can threaten to incarcerate the human
controller. If the course of action is merely abhorrent, colleagues, friends,
and relatives could apply social pressures. AEs lack those vulnerabilities
because no human associated with them has control. As a result, AEs have
greater freedom to pursue unpopular goals using unpopular methods.
In deciding to attempt a coup, bomb a restaurant, or assemble an armed
group to attack a shopping center, a human-controlled entity puts the lives
of its human controllers at risk. The same decisions on behalf of an AE risk
nothing but the resources the AE spends in planning and execution. If an
AE cares at all about self-preservation, it will be only as a means of
achieving some other goal for which it has been programmed.87 Deterrence
of an AE from its goals, as distinguished from particular means of achieving
them, is impossible.
c. Replication
AEs can replicate themselves quickly and easily. If an AE’s operations
are entirely online, replication may be as easy as forming a new entity and
electronically copying an algorithm. An entity can be formed in some

87. See, e.g., MURRAY SHANAHAN, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY 145–46 (2015); id. at 146
(“[I]f the AI’s reward function involves maximizing widget production, then the optimal strategy might
be to commission a widget factor and then self-destruct.”); Ben Goertzel, Superintelligence: Fears,
Promises and Potentials, 24 J. EVOLUTION & TECH. 55 (2015) (“It may well be that “self-preservation”
is an anthropomorphic or biomorphic idea, and very advanced AGI systems might go far beyond such
notions.”).

2018]

ALGORITHMIC ENTITIES

905

jurisdictions in as little as an hour and for as little as seventy dollars.88
(While entities are not, strictly speaking, copies of other entities, they can
be identical to other entities, which has the same effect.)
Easy replication supports several possible strategies. First, replication in
a destination jurisdiction followed by dissolution of the entity in the original
jurisdiction may put the AE beyond the legal reach of the original
jurisdiction.89 For a human-controlled entity to escape the reach of the
original jurisdiction, the human would have to move physically to the
destination jurisdiction.
Second, replication can make an AE harder to destroy. For example, if
copies of an AE exist in three jurisdictions, each is a person with its own
rights. A court order revoking the charter of one or seizing the assets of
another would have no effect on the third. It could continue to exist and
replicate further. The strategy does not work as well for a human-controlled
entity. To replicate a human-controlled entity, one must either recruit
additional humans to control the copies or put the same human in control of
the copies. The former is time consuming because it requires a personnel
search. It is complex because each human must be appropriately motivated.
It is risky because every person is different and difficult to assess. The latter
leaves the same person in control of all the entities, providing the basis for
a court to disregard their separate existences. In short, algorithms can be
almost instantly cloned; humans cannot.
Third, replication can operate as a method of hedging. Consider, for
example, the hypothetical situation in which ten jurisdictions are
considering a ban on AEs and the ban has a ninety percent chance of
adoption in each. An AE that replicated itself in each of the ten jurisdictions
would expect to survive in one.
Fourth, because they know what each other will do,90 replications may
be able to cooperate for mutual benefit without the necessity for agreement
or collusion. Ants and bees are biological examples of organisms in which
replications cooperate.91

88. Arizona Corporation Commission, Corporations Division Fee Schedule – Limited Liability
Companies, http://www.azcc.gov/Divisions/Corporations/Fee-Schedule-LLCs.pdf (showing “total fee
for regular processing” as $50 for LLC Articles of Organization); State of Delaware: The Official
Website of the First State, https://corp.delaware.gov/expserv.shtml (offering one-hour incorporation for
$1,000).
89. This strategy is the subject of Part II.B below.
90. By definition, each replication contains the same code. A replication can predict the actions of
another by examining its own code.
91. Aviram Gelblum et al., Ant Groups Optimally Amplify the Effect of Transiently Informed
Individuals, NATURE COMMUNICATIONS (July 28, 2015), https://www.nature.com/articles/n
comms8729 [https://perma.cc/7KPM-Y36E].
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Because they can act ruthlessly, cannot be deterred, and can replicate
easily, AEs are more dangerous than algorithms that aid human-controlled
entities. The issue is not whether humans should allow experimentation with
AEs. They should not. The issue is whether humans can prevent AEs. That
is the subject of the next Part.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF MAINTAINING HUMAN CONTROL
This Part argues that current law provides no effective mechanisms for
preventing the formation of algorithmic entities or controlling them once
they exist. First, initiators could put algorithms in control of most types of
artificial entities without violating any law. As the entity system currently
operates, initiators—and AEs once they are formed—can choose among
thousands of entity types made available by hundreds of states and
countries. Second, if threatened by proposed changes in their governing
legal regimes, algorithms could change legal regimes by migrating across
borders or changing entity types. They could do so without changing the
locations of their physical operations. Third, in most jurisdictions, the law
does not require that entities reveal their beneficial owners or controllers,
making it difficult, if not impossible, for enforcement agencies to identify
those whose controllers are not human. Each of these three points is
addressed in a separate section.
A. The Dispersion Problem
AEs will be difficult for humans to control because they can disperse
among virtually any type of entity, domestic or foreign. Although American
LLC statutes contemplate that the entity will have at least one member,92
that member can be an LLC or other artificial person.93 As Bayern noted, a
dyad consisting of two LLCs that are the sole members of each other satisfy
that requirement.94 Thus, formation of AEs is probably possible under the
LLC statutes of all, or nearly all, U.S. jurisdictions. As shown in this section,
the formation of AEs is probably possible under the Delaware General
Corporation Law, the Model Business Corporation Act, the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. Those statutes govern the four

92. See, e.g., Scherer, Part One and Scherer, Part Two, supra note 69.
93. E.g., ULLCA § 102(11) (defining a member as a person who has become a member); ULLCA
§ 102(15) (defining a person to include artificial entities); 18 DEL. CODE §101(11) (defining a member
as a person who has become a member); 18 DEL. CODE §101(12) (defining a person to include artificial
entities).
94. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 104 n.43.
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business entity types most common under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions.
1. Delaware Corporations
Bayern considered it “impossible to create an autonomous corporation”
because corporation statutes require that corporations be governed by
boards of directors populated by “natural persons.”95 The requirement that
a Delaware corporation be managed by a board of directors composed of
natural persons is, however, merely a default rule. Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL) § 141(a) provides that “the business and affairs
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”96 Scholars
have interpreted this provision as “allow[ing] corporations to modify the
role of the board of directors, including not having a board.” 97 To verify the
lack of need for a director who is a natural person, I formed a Delaware
corporation, BA 230 Corporation, with this provision in its certificate of
incorporation: “Pursuant to Delaware General Corporation Law § 141(a),
this corporation shall not have a board of directors, but shall instead be
managed by BA 230 LLC.”98 From the language of the statute, the opinions
of other scholars, and the grant of BA 230 Corporation’s charter by the
Delaware Secretary of State, I conclude that Delaware law does not require
that a natural person participate in the management of a Delaware
corporation. An artificial person can manage a Delaware corporation. As a
result, AEs can be constructed in a variety of ways, using only the corporate
form.
One way would be to create a corporate dyad. The certificates of

95. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 98 (“Clearly, of course, this requirement makes it
impossible to create an autonomous corporation—that is, one that does not require an ongoing
association with any natural persons.”).
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2016) (emphasis added).
97. Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1057 n.22 (2014); see also Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie,
Larry from the Left: An Appreciation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 121, 129 (2014) (“Thus the board—the
central feature of corporate governance—appears to be merely a default rule.”); Grant M. Hayden &
Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2011) (“Thus the board—the central feature of corporate governance—appears to
be merely a default rule.”); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003)
(“Delaware law . . . treats board governance as a default rule that can be ‘bargained around’ in the
corporate charter.”).
98.BA 230 CORPORATION, CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION (2016), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu
/BA230.pdf.
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incorporation of Parent Corporation and Subsidiary Corporation would
provide for reciprocal management. That is, Parent Corporation’s business
and affairs would be managed by Subsidiary Corporation and Subsidiary
Corporation’s business and affairs would be managed by Parent
Corporation. Subsidiary Corporation would issue all of its shares to Parent
Corporation. Nothing in the DGCL requires that a corporation issue
shares,99 and Parent Corporation would not issue any. Neither corporation
would have a board of directors. The same algorithm would manage both
corporations, and both would qualify under my definition of an AE.100
Third parties transacting with Subsidiary Corporation might have two
concerns about Parent Corporation’s failure to issue shares. First, by having
no stockholders, Parent Corporation might be in violation of DGCL
§ 211(b)’s mandate that “an annual meeting of stockholders shall be held
for the election of directors on a date and at a time designated by or in the
manner provide in the bylaws.” Such a meeting is unnecessary because
Subsidiary Corporation has no board of directors and so cannot elect
directors to it. Even if the court were to read the statute as requiring an
annual meeting nevertheless, DGCL § 211(b) provides that failure to hold a
required meeting of shareholders “shall not affect otherwise valid corporate
acts or work a forfeiture or dissolution of the corporation.” The transaction
between Subsidiary Corporation and the third party would be an otherwise
valid corporate act.
A few courts have held that a corporation’s initiators may own it even in
the absence of stock issuance.101 Thus, Parent Corporation’s initiator—or
that initiator’s successors in interest—might later seek to force issuance of
Parent Corporation’s shares to themselves as a means of removing the
algorithm from control. To prevent initiators, their creditors, courts, or
intermeddlers from doing so, the initiator could itself be an artificial entity.
Upon initiation, the initiator could renounce any residual ownership of the
corporation, transfer its remaining rights to the AE, and dissolve. No entity
with a claim to the shares would remain. This device would also protect the
initiator from liability for failure to exercise control in the period after
initiation.

99. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 151(a) (2017) states that “[e]very corporation may issue 1 or more
classes of stock . . . .” (emphasis added). 8 DEL. CODE § 274 specifically contemplates that a corporation
may commence business without having issued shares: “[I]f the corporation has begun business but it
has not issued shares, all debts of the corporation have been paid . . . .”
100. See supra Part I.
101. For example, the court in Castiel v. Hegenbarth, 539 So. 2d 931, 934 (La. Ct. App. 1989) held
that “actual ownership of a corporation may be determined from all the facts in a case when stock
certificates are not issued.” But a corporate initiator that renounced ownership and dissolved could not
later claim ownership, even under those authorities. See id.
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Subsidiary Corporation would have the full range of powers and abilities
of a Delaware corporation. In particular, it could transact outside the
ordinary course of its business by merging with other corporations or selling
its assets. As a condition of such contracting, third parties customarily
require opinion letters from corporate counsel stating, among other things,
that the corporation took all action necessary to authorize the transaction.
Subsidiary Corporation’s counsel will require documentary evidence before
issuing the opinion. Subsidiary Corporation could provide such evidence by
furnishing Subsidiary Corporation’s certificate of incorporation, Parent
Corporation’s written consent as manager to the issuance of all of
Subsidiary Corporation’s shares to Parent Corporation, and Parent
Corporation’s written consent as shareholder to Subsidiary Corporation’s
transaction. The provision in Subsidiary Corporation’s certificate of
incorporation authorizing Parent to manage Subsidiary in lieu of a board
would explain the absence of a Subsidiary Corporation directors’ resolution.
Parent Corporation’s written consent as manager would prove that Parent
Corporation, as Subsidiary’s manager, authorized Subsidiary Corporation’s
issuance of its shares to Parent Corporation. Parent’s written consent as
shareholder would prove that Subsidiary’s sole shareholder had
unanimously approved the transaction.
Parent Corporation could not enter into any transaction that required
approval of its shareholders because it would have no shareholders. But
Parent Corporation would have the necessary authority to fulfill its two
purposes: managing Subsidiary Corporation and voting Subsidiary
Corporation’s shares. Parent Corporation’s management is in the ordinary
course of Parent Corporation’s business, and Parent Corporation’s manager,
Subsidiary Corporation, does not need the approval of Parent Corporation’s
shareholders to vote Subsidiary Corporation’s shares.102
In parent-company voting, DGCL § 160(c) disqualifies votes of parent
company shares cast by parent’s majority-owned subsidiary. That provision
does not apply in this hypothetical for two reasons. First, DGCL § 160(c)
has been interpreted to bar only subsidiary voting in parent elections. It does
not also bar the voting employed here—parent voting in subsidiary
elections. As the court explained:
[Barring both votes] would lead to the inequitable and anomalous

102. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV.
601, 616 (2006) (“Under the Delaware Code, for example, shareholder voting rights are essentially
limited to the election of directors and approval of charter or bylaw amendments, mergers, sales of
substantially all of the corporation’s assets, and voluntary dissolution.”).
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result that the shares of the parent company owned by the subsidiary
are sterilized and the shares of the subsidiary owned by the parent
are also sterilized. Under plaintiffs’ view, the parent company not
only loses the ability to vote its shares owned by the subsidiary, as
contemplated by the statute, but also loses voting control over its
subsidiary as well.103
Second, Parent Corporation does not need to vote the shares of
Subsidiary Corporation to control Subsidiary Corporation. It controls
Subsidiary Corporation through its management contract. The possibility
that the two corporations accomplished through a management contract
what they could not have through reciprocal shareholdings is not a concern
under Delaware law. Delaware follows the doctrine of independent legal
significance: 104
[A]ction taken in accordance with different sections of [the Delaware
General Corporation Law] are acts of independent legal significance
even though the end result may be the same under different sections.
The mere fact that the result of actions taken under one section may
be the same as the result of action taken under another section does
not require that the legality of the result must be tested by the
requirements of the second section.105
Even if Subsidiary Corporation did own and vote the shares of Parent
Corporation, the scheme could still work if the AE formed Parent
Corporation under the law of a jurisdiction that did not follow the rule in
DGCL § 160(c). In precisely that situation, the Delaware Supreme Court
held that the law of the parent corporation’s incorporation jurisdiction—
Panama law—applied and allowed the Delaware subsidiary to vote shares
in its Parent.106 Other countries follow the same rule as Panama.107 Thus, on
the facts of the hypothetical, the Delaware subsidiary can control both itself
and its parent through circular shareholdings.

103. In re Best Lock Corp. S’holder Litig., 845 A.2d 1057, 1088 (Del. Ch. 2001) (emphasis in
original).
104. In re Hesston Corp., 870 P.2d 17, 39–40 (Kan. 1994).
105. Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 377 (Del. 1963).
106. McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 212 (Del. 1987) (holding that “under limited
circumstances the laws of Panama permit a subsidiary to vote the shares of its parent”); id. at 218
(holding that “application of 8 Del. C. § 160(c) to [the Panamanian parent corporation] would unfairly
and, in our opinion, unconstitutionally, subject those intimately involved with the management of the
corporation to the laws of Delaware”).
107. E.g., Furman v. Sherwood, 833 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Since, under a Bermuda
Supreme Court ruling, Sea Containers’ subsidiaries are permitted to vote the shares they hold in their
parent, this ownership situation effectively insulated the Company from new hostile takeover bids.”).
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2. Model Business Corporation Act Corporations
Initiators could create algorithmic corporations under the Model
Business Corporation Act in essentially the same manner. Although MBCA
§ 8.01(a) requires that “[e]xcept as may be provided in an agreement
authorized under section 7.32, each corporation shall have a board of
directors,” MBCA § 7.32(a) makes “effective” an agreement among the
shareholders that “eliminates the board of directors.”
If such an agreement “limits the discretion or powers of the board of
directors,” it “impose[s] upon the person or persons in whom such discretion
or powers are vested, liability for acts or omissions imposed by law on
directors.”108 Because the definitions in MBCA § 1.40 make clear that those
“persons” may include foreign and domestic corporations, partnerships,
limited partnerships, and limited liability companies,109 it is also clear that
the shareholders who make the agreement need not be natural persons. No
other provision requires the involvement of a natural person in an MBCA
corporation.
The requirement that the agreement be “among the shareholders” implies
the necessity for at least two shareholders. But the Official Comment to
MBCA § 7.32(b) states that “[w]here the corporation has a single
shareholder, the requirement of an ‘agreement among the shareholders’ is
satisfied by the unilateral action of the shareholder in establishing the terms
of the agreement, evidenced by provisions in the articles of incorporation or
bylaws, or in a writing signed by the sole shareholder.”
It follows that an initiator could create an algorithmic corporation in an
MBCA jurisdiction by creating the corporation and another entity of any
type to serve as its shareholder. The initiator would put the algorithm in
control of both. The shareholder entity could then adopt a shareholder
agreement that eliminated the corporation’s board of directors and
transferred the board’s discretion and powers to the shareholder. The result
would be an AE-owned and controlled, humanless MBCA corporation.
3. Partnerships
Initiators can create algorithmic limited partnerships under the Uniform

108. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(e) (2016).
109. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40 (2016) defines “person” to include “an individual or an entity,”
defines “entity” to include both a “domestic and foreign business corporation” and an “unincorporated
entity,” and defines “unincorporated entity” to include “a general partnership, limited liability company,
limited partnership, business trust, joint stock association and unincorporated nonprofit association.”
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Limited Partnership Act (2001) (ULPA). Formation of a limited partnership
requires that “at least one person has become a general partner” and “at least
one person has become a limited partner.”110 The partners must be
“person[s],”111 but those persons can be virtually any kind of artificial
entity.112 The use of shell corporations as partners in limited partnerships is
commonplace.113 To create an algorithmic limited partnership, the initiator
would first create the entities that would serve as the general and limited
partners and then create the limited partnership between them. To assure the
algorithm complete autonomy, the initiator should place the general partner,
the limited partner, and the limited partnership under the algorithm’s
control. All three entities should remain in existence because any of them
may be called upon to act.114
Initiators can also create algorithmic general partnerships under the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (2013) (RUPA). The initiator would begin
by creating two artificial entities of almost any type, placing them under
algorithmic control, and causing them to enter into a partnership agreement.
Execution of the agreement would create the general partnership. The
agreement would provide for the algorithm to manage and conduct the
partnership business and make all partnership decisions whether in or out of
the ordinary course of business. Under RUPA § 105(b), the agreement
would prevail over the conflicting terms of RUPA § 401.115 To assure
recognition of the partnership, both partners should remain in existence. The
general partnership could become a limited liability partnership by filing a
statement of qualification.116
4. The AE-Human Interface
In the analysis thus far, I have assumed that algorithms could control

110. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (ULPA) § 201(d) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2001) (amended 2013).
111. Id. § 102(7), (11).
112. Id. § 102(15) (defining person to mean “an individual, business corporation, nonprofit
corporation, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company . . . limited cooperative
association, unincorporated nonprofit association, statutory trust, business trust, common-law business
trust, estate, trust, association, joint venture, public corporation, government or governmental
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity”).
113. Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate General Partners of Limited Partnerships, 1 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 73, 85 (1997) (“[W]here limited partnerships are used today, it is the norm to use a
corporation as the sole general partner.”).
114. ULPA § 406(a) (2013) (general partner’s right to manage the partnership); § 406(b) (limited
partner’s consent necessary to take certain actions); § 801(a)(3)(B)(i) (limited partner consent necessary
to continue limited partnership in certain circumstances).
115. The control provisions in UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 401(h), (k) (2013) are expressly subject to the
terms of the partnership agreement. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § § 105(b), (c) (2013).
116. Id. § 901(c).
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entities only by acting directly on behalf of the entities. But algorithms
could also control entities by controlling humans who act on behalf of the
entities pursuant to the algorithms’ instructions. Entities so organized would
still meet the definition of an AE because the human would have neither the
right nor the ability to control the algorithm.
a. Private Company Control
For example, an AE that owned the voting shares of a corporation could
control the corporation by electing one or more human directors, telling the
directors what action to take, and removing and replacing the directors who
refused to take that action. Such domination of directors by shareholders is
contrary to law in virtually all jurisdictions.117 Regardless of the manner of
their selection, all directors are required by law to act in what they believe
to be the best interests of the corporation.118
Despite the law, such domination is common and effective.119 Laws and
contracts often give particular shareholder constituencies the power to elect
some portion of the directors as a means of assuring the constituency
“representation” on the board. Directors so elected are referred to as
“constituency directors.”120 Examples include directors appointed to
represent “preferred shareholders, controlling shareholders, joint venturers,

117. Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’
Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069, 1098 (“According to what is probably the majority
view, instructions are not even possible when the corporation is part of a corporate group.”).
118. Id. at 1088 (“[J]urisdictions impose a single set of fiduciary duties on directors—namely
benefiting the corporation ‘as a whole,’ even if it is not clear what this precisely means.”); Simone M.
Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 344
(2013) (“[O]nce a director has been elected to a corporation’s board, she owes undivided loyalty to the
shareholders of that corporation—regardless of how she was nominated or by whom.”). Koh notes that:
It is . . . not unusual for investors, creditors or employees to be given a right to board
representation. It is, however, trite that all directors, and seemingly without exception, owe an
overarching obligation to serve in good faith in the best interests of the company on whose
board they are members.
Pearlie Koh, The Nominee Director’s Tangled Lot, 2007 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 148, 148.
119. Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 117, at 1117 (“In practice, restrictions imposed by corporate
law on the books may not matter all that much.”); Amir N. Licht, State Intervention in Corporate
Governance: National Interest and Board Composition, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 597, 610 (2012)
(“Since the power to appoint the board of directors is vested in the general meeting, which is controlled
by the dominant shareholder, the board may fulfill the latter’s explicit requests and implicit expectations,
including in regard to affiliated-party transactions and other forms of extracting private benefits.”); E.W.
Thomas, The Role of Nominee Directors and the Liability of Their Appointors, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND THE DUTIES OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 148, 150 (Ian Ramsay ed., 1997) (“I therefore
observe that, in reality, the primary or ultimate loyalty of most nominee directors is reserved for their
appointors and not the company to which they have been appointed.”); id. (“[I]n practice nominee
directors are appointed to represent the interests of their appointors and that they function accordingly.”).
120. See, e.g., Sepe, supra note 118 (explaining constituency directors).
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family members, financial institutions, shareholder activists, government
agencies, private-equity funds, venture capitalists, [and] labor unions”121 as
well as directors elected through cumulative voting122 and directors placed
on debtors’ boards by secured creditors to block the debtors from filing
bankruptcy.123
Numerous commentators have pointed out the inconsistency of the
requirements placed on constituency directors—they must act solely in the
interests of the corporation in all instances and they must represent their
constituency in at least some instances.124 The need for thousands of
directors, at all levels of corporate respectability, to manage that
inconsistency has generated a practice in which constituency directors
actually represent their constituency while credibly professing to represent
the corporation as a whole.125 The skill they acquire in doing so is honed by
competition for directorships in a robust market for constituency directors.
“Nominee director” is a term sometimes used interchangeably with
constituency director, but sometimes used to refer only to directors who
agree expressly or impliedly to do whatever they are told. The furnishing of
compliant nominee directors is a large-scale, and sometimes regulated
business in offshore corporate havens,126 and a business present in many

121. Cyril Moscow, Director Confidentiality, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 206–07 (2011). See
also Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 117, at 1079–84 (listing categories of constituency directors).
122. Moscow, supra note 121, at 206–07. See also Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 117, at 1072
(discussing venture capitalists); id. at 1073 (noting that “Germany famously gives half of the seats on
the supervisory board of its largest firms to employee representatives”).
123. See In re Lake Michigan Beach Pottawattamie Resort LLC, 547 B.R. 899, 913 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2016) (“The essential playbook for a successful blocking director structure is this: the director must
be subject to normal director fiduciary duties and therefore in some circumstances vote in favor of a
bankruptcy filing, even if it is not in the best interests of the creditor that they were chosen by.”).
124. Thomas, supra note 119, at 151 (“The conflict between nominee directors’ loyalty to the
company in company law theory and their loyalty to the appointor in commercial practice is readily
apparent.”). Thomas also states:
In commercial practice, the relationship of the appointors and the nominee directors whom they
have appointed is almost invariably that of principal and agent or employer and employee. Yet,
acting as an agent or employee results in the nominee director being, to a greater or lesser
extent, in breach of the recognised fiduciary duties of a director.
Id. at 148. See also Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 117, at 1112 (noting that “[i]n cases where a clear
advantage is conferred to the sponsoring shareholder, constituency directors are thus not even in the
position to promote their sponsors’ ‘interests’ because they have a conflict of interest”).
125. In recognition of this reality, the United Kingdom Companies Act defines a “shadow director”
as “a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are
accustomed to act,” Companies Act § 251 (2008), and requires his or her disclosure. Id. § 859, § 855(1).
Similar provisions have been adopted in Australia and New Zealand. Lynne Taylor, Expanding the Pool
of Defendant Directors in a Corporate Insolvency: De Facto Directors, Shadow Directors and Other
Categories of Deemed Directors, 16 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 203, 207–08 (2010).
126. See Taylor, supra note 125, at 207–08; James Ball, More than 175,000 UK Companies Have
Offshore Directors, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/04/ukcompanies-offshore-directors-figures [https://perma.cc/KE8P-2QEX]. See, e.g., Company Management
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other countries as well.127 U.S. hedge funds routinely hire nominee
directors.128 Although some governments require that at least one director
of a corporation doing business in the country be a resident of the country,129
most allow all nominee directors to serve from anywhere in the world.130
Nominee directors tend to prefer to serve from corporate haven
jurisdictions.131 The most successful nominee directors have each held more
than four thousand directorships.132
The result is that AEs could easily purchase the services of compliant
directors. Contracts for the services of nominee directors typically provide
that an “authorized person” will furnish instructions to the director.133 The
principal can terminate the nominee’s appointment at any time without
giving any reason, and the nominee will resign.134 An even more direct

Law §§ 5(2)(b), 3(1)(h) (2003) (Cayman Is.) (requiring a “company management license” for, among
other things, “arranging for another person to act as or fulfil the function of director or alternate director
of a company”).
127. GU MINKANG, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COMPANY LAW 173 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that “in
practice, nominee directors (which are the equivalent to legal person directors) commonly exist in
China”); Henry Tan & Matthew Kyle, Local Directors No Longer Needed in Japan: Practical Issues
with the Recent Rule Change, EXPORT TO JAPAN (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.exporttojapan.co.
uk/blog/local-directors-no-longer-needed-in-japan-practical-issues-with-the-recent-rule-change
[https://perma.cc/C6AN-FBDW] (“[I]f you do not want to run into delays during your set up phase, it
may be best to either hire a representative director from the pool of talent in Japan or to appoint a
nominee local representative from a reputable service provider.”); Companies Act § 150(1) (2013)
(India) (“[A]n independent director may be selected from a data bank containing names, addresses and
qualifications of persons who are eligible and willing to act as independent directors, maintained by
anybody, institute or association, as may by notified by the Central Government.”); Japan Nominee
Director Services, JAPAN VISA, http://www.japanvisa.com/japan-nominee-directors [https://perma
.cc/H7SQ-W8GY] (offering the services of nominee directors in Japan).
128. Azam Ahmed, In Caymans, It’s Simple to Fill a Hedge Fund Board, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(July 1, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/in-caymans-its-simple-to-fill-a-hedge-fundboard/ [https://perma.cc/FV4H-FRU2] (“An analysis of thousands of United States securities filings by
The New York Times shows that dozens of directors sit on the boards of 24 or more funds in the
Caymans.”).
129. E.g., Companies Act § 145(1) (2006) (Sing.) (“Every company shall have at least one director
who is ordinarily resident in Singapore.”).
130. E.g., Ball, supra note 126 (UK companies with directors serving from corporate havens).
131. Id.
132. James Ball, Offshore Secrets: How Many Companies Do ‘Sham Directors’ Control?,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/datablog/2012/nov/26/offshore-secretscompanies-sham-directors [https://perma.cc/CQ8P-V6QG] (reporting the names of two individuals each
of whom were listed as directors for more than 4,000 companies in the records of four tax havens).
133. E.g., Agreement of Nominee Services, LEAPLAW, http://www.leaplaw.com/pubSearch/
preview/nominee.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC6T-YWQR] (“The Principal shall ensure that instructions are
given to the Firm or the Nominee in such manner as may be required by the Firm or the Nominee.”);
Nominee Director Agreement, ASSET INVESTMENT SERVICES, http://www.assetprotection
.cz/knihovna/samples_of_corporate_documents/nominee_director_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y
BA7-XZW4] (“Nominee Director will be elected as a Director of ‘___________’ and will act in such
capacity only under the express written instructions of beneficial shareholder.”).
134. E.g., Agreement of Nominee Services, LEAPLAW, supra note 133, at ¶ 12 (“The Principal may
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method of control through a nominee is for the nominee director to give the
controller a power of attorney to act for the nominee director.135
AE shareholders need not fear that the corporation’s nominee directors
would breach their resignation contracts. DGCL § 228(a) authorizes the
holder of a majority of the issued shares of a Delaware corporation to
remove and replace any or all of the corporation’s directors at any time.136
The shareholder does so by signed, written consent delivered to the
corporation. Because removal does not require prior notice to the director,
the consent can be effective immediately upon its receipt by the corporation.
The leverage generated by this right to remove and replace is effective
to enable human shareholders to control directors.137 No reason exists to
believe it would be less effective when used by AE shareholders in similarly
nefarious circumstances.138
All of these things are possible because entity law allows them. Entity
law allows them because the system of charter competition—not
government—is generating entity law.

terminate the provision of the Services by notice in writing to the Firm . . . .”); Nominee Director
Agreement, ASSET INVESTMENT SERVICES, supra note 133, at ¶ 6 (“Nominee Director will resign his
position of Director within 7 days of receiving a request in writing to do so by Beneficial Shareholder.”).
135. Memorandum of Law in Support of the United States’ Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve
John Doe Summonses, filed Mar. 25, 2002, case no. 02-0046, United States District Court for the
Northern District of California (“One way . . . is for the nominee directors to provide the taxpayer with
power of attorney in all matters related to the running of the IBC, allowing the taxpayer to act as an
officer of the IBC and handle day-to-day operations without being an officer.”).
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (2017) provides:
[A]ny action which may be taken at any annual or special meeting of . . . stockholders, may be
taken without a meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, if a consent or consents in
writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by the holders of outstanding stock
having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take
such action at a meeting . . . and shall be delivered to the corporation . . . .
137. Thomas, supra note 119, at 150 (“[I]n reality, the primary or ultimate loyalty of most nominee
directors is reserved for their appointors and not the company to which they have been appointed.”).
U.S. courts have also shown skepticism regarding nominee directors’ independence from their
appointors:
The court should not [believe] that the members of a Board of Directors elected by the dominant
and accused majority stockholder, after accusations of wrongdoing have been made, were
selected for membership on the Board to protect the interests of the minority stockholders and
to assure a vigorous prosecution of effective litigation against the offending majority.
Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53 (5th Cir. 1980).
138. Declaration of Randy Hooczko, In re Tax Liabilities of John Does (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014)
(describing online advertisements offering nominee directors); Nominee Director UK,
https://www.mailboxuk.com/nominee-director-uk?MUCampaign=CP-NomineeDirectorNominee%20director%20service&gclid=CjwKEAjwkPS6BRD2ioKR7K245jASJAD1ZqHOWxmWQ
GEiIX8CpxjDNT66hSqWuxYFjCfRn5moGZBaZBoC4pfw_wcB (website offering British and UK
resident nominal directors for UK and International Companies). See Ahmed, supra note 128 (referring
to the “director-for-hire business”).
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b. Public Company Control
Public companies raise large amounts of capital by selling stock in public
markets. Shareholders control public companies by electing natural persons
to the companies’ boards of directors. In the United States, those elections
are highly regulated.139 The companies must disclose their own financial
conditions, the identities of the entities that directly or indirectly control
them, and the compensation they pay to their officers and directors.
Candidates for directorships must disclose their backgrounds, and investors
expect that the candidates will be prominent, reputable businesspersons.
Companies that do not have boards might find it difficult or impossible
to sell their shares in public markets, and artificial entities are not eligible
to serve on boards in U.S. jurisdictions. Thus, as a practical matter, AEs
may be able to control public companies only if, in addition to holding
controlling blocks of shares, the AEs could persuade sufficiently prominent
and reputable businesspeople to serve as directors of those public
companies. The AEs might accomplish that either by persuading
prospective directors that AE-control poses no threat to the prospective
directors’ reputations, or by failing to reveal their AE natures to the
prospective directors.
Prominent, reputable businesspersons have shown no reluctance to serve
on public company boards merely because a single person controls the
company. Facebook, Inc. is a good illustration. Mark Zuckerberg owns 55.9
percent of Facebook’s voting power. Yet, Facebook’s outside directors are
all prominent, reputable businesspersons.140 Zuckerberg could remove any
or all of them at any time without prior notice, but all have chosen to serve
nevertheless.
Legal scholars who are aware that AEs are possible, regard them
positively.141 As long as that positive regard persists, a prospective

139. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14a-1–14a-9.
140. They are Marc L. Andreessen, a venture capitalist who was a member of the board at HewlettPackard Company; Erskine B. Bowles, a former White House Chief of Staff; Susan D. DesmondHellmann, CEO of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Reed Hastings, CEO and Board Chairman of
Netflix, Inc.; Jan Koum, co-founder and CEO of WhatsApp Inc.; and Peter A. Thiel, co-founder and
former CEO of PayPal. FACEBOOK, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (Feb. 2, 2017).
141. E.g., Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11 and accompanying text; Daniel M. Häusermann,
Memberless Legal Entities Operated by Autonomous Systems—Some Thoughts on Shawn Bayern’s
Article ‘The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems’
from a Swiss Law, UNIVERSITY OF ST. GALLEN (Aug. 23, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper s.cfm
?abstract_id=2827504 (“I believe that, if and when autonomous systems become sophisticated enough
to operate a legal entity, the demand for autonomously operated entities that pursue “human-centric”
objectives, such as profit-making or charitable purposes, will be greater than the demand for entities that
have no human beneficiaries at all.”).
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director’s calculus for deciding whether to join the board of an AEcontrolled public company might be no different than his or her calculus for
deciding whether to join the board of any other single-person-controlled
public company. The prospect will want assurances from the control person
regarding the company’s circumstances and a clear path to exit in the event
those assurances are breached. Large, public company directorships are
highly attractive because they typically pay $200,000 to $400,000 a year for
preparing for, and attending, about four to eight meetings a year.142 In
addition, such directorships confer power, prestige, invaluable contacts, and
access to information. AEs should have no difficulty in recruiting board
members for companies with publicly traded shares, even though the shares
lack voting control.143
If I am correct in my prediction that AEs will be criminally inclined, AEs
will soon be poorly regarded and might have to conceal their natures to
maintain access to capital markets. That might be difficult. Current law
requires any person that, individually or as part of a group, directly or
indirectly owns or controls more than 5 percent of the shares of public
companies, to disclose their identity, ownership, and voting power.144
Current law does not require disclosure of algorithmic control, but the
disclosures it does require would signal to astute observers the possibility
of algorithmic control.
To illustrate, an AE might control a private equity firm by owning 51
percent of the private equity firm’s shares. The private equity firm might in
turn control a public company by owning 40 million (40 percent) of the
public company’s shares. Under those circumstances, the AE would be
required to report the number of public company shares beneficially owned
by it. SEC regulations define beneficial ownership to include both
ownership and control:
(a) [A] beneficial owner of a security includes any person who,
directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement,
understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares:
(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the

142. See, e.g., FW COOK, 2016 DIRECTOR COMPENSATION REPORT 1, https://www.fwcoo
k.com/content/documents/publications/11-30-16_FWC_2016_Director_Comp_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2GYH-VXVD] (“Large-cap companies in our study pay directors $260,000 at the
median and $300,000 at the 75th percentile, unchanged from last year.”).
143. See, e.g., Prospectus (Form 424(b)(4)), SNAP, INC. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.s
ec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1564408/000119312517068848/0001193125-17-068848-index.htm
[https://perma.cc/94JV-LW75] (“This is an initial public offering of shares of non-voting Class A
common stock of Snap Inc.”).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1).
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voting of, such security; and/or,
(2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to
direct the disposition of, such security.145
That number would be the number of shares owned by the private equity
firm (40,000,000) multiplied by the proportion of the private equity firm’s
shares owed by the AE (51 percent), which is 20,400,000. If the AE had
neither shareholders nor outside controllers, no further disclosure would be
required. The algorithm would control the public company indirectly, but
would not be required to disclose its existence because the algorithm would
not be a person.
But any entity that disclosed ownership of a controlling interest in a
public company, without disclosing the entity’s human beneficial owners
would arouse suspicions, and probably attract investigations. An AE might
be able to avoid such suspicions by appointing nominee shareholders. But
if those nominee shareholders actually controlled the AE, they would also
have the right to exclude the algorithm from control. If those nominee
shareholders did not actually control the AE, the disclosure that they held
“sole voting power” would be false. Thus, an AE could control a public
company without disclosing its nature, but only by committing securities
fraud.
5. Non-U.S. Entities
To determine the extent to which algorithms could control foreign
entities, I chose eight representative jurisdictions for investigation:
Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, the Ras
Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone, Japan, India, and China. In choosing them, I
sought geographical diversity and diversity in the jurisdictions’ approaches
to charter competition. Germany and the United Kingdom are members of
the European Union. Germany requires that companies register at their real
seats and so does not export entities.146 The United Kingdom is an exiting
EU member that adheres to the internal affairs doctrine147 and has been a

145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3.
146. See, e.g., Jens Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice of Law, 38 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 51, 64 n.48 (2005) (“German rules on registration and disclosure requirements cannot,
at present, gain relevance to the market for corporate charters in any case: under German corporate law,
corporations cannot incorporate in Germany unless their real seat is also located in Germany.”).
147. E.g., Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT’L
L. 477, 479 n.9 (2004) (“Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom apply the state of
incorporation doctrine.”).
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major exporter of entities.148 Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, and the Ras
Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone Authority in the United Arab Emirates (RAK
FTZ) are corporate havens. They sell entities principally for export. Japan,
India, and China are three of the worlds’ largest economies. For each
country, I investigated the most commonly registered entity types and report
Table 1. Legal Receptivity to AEs in Representative Countries
(ordered from greatest to least)
Jurisdiction
and entity
type

Are members Is circular Are shareholder
Must an AE
or shareholders ownership
names
manage through
required?
prohibited?
reported?
humans?

1. Cayman
Islands LLC

Yes

No

No

No

2. RAK FTZ
Offshore Co.

Yes

Weak
prohibition

Yes, to public

No

3. United
Kingdom Co.

Yes

Yes

Yes, to public

No, but requires
one human
director

4. P.R.C.
LLC

Yes

No

Yes, initiators
to government

One director,
one supervisor

5. German
GmbH

Yes

No

Yes, to public

One director

6. Japan LLC

Yes

No

Yes, to
government

Representative

7. India LLP

Yes

No

Yes, to
government

Two designated
partners

8. Swiss LLC

Yes

Yes

Yes, to public

Managing
director

in Table 1 on the type most hospitable to AEs.
Generally speaking, the laws of those eight jurisdictions are less
receptive to AEs than are the laws of U.S. jurisdictions. In contrast to U.S.

148. William W. Bratton et al., How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative
Analysis, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 374 (2009) (“[S]hortly after the ECJ decisions more than ten percent
of the newly incorporated companies in Germany were limited. This made Germany the absolute leader
in post-Centros emigrations while the United Kingdom, with its private limited company form, is the
overwhelmingly favorite host jurisdiction.”); Ball, supra note 126 (reporting that “more than 60,000”
companies registered in the United Kingdom and then active were listed as having directors in offshore
jurisdictions “such as the Channel Islands, British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Dubai and the Seychelles”).
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jurisdictions, which generally leave it to initiators to issue—or not to
issue—shares or memberships after formation, all eight foreign jurisdictions
required that their entities have members or shareholders in place, and so in
control, at formation.149 None of their laws permits memberless entities.
In all eight jurisdictions, the controlling members or shareholders could
themselves be artificial entities.150 Five of the eight jurisdictions require the
controlling artificial entities to designate natural persons to act for them.151

149. LLC Law § 5(1) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“[A] limited liability company shall at all times have
at least one member.”); RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations § 19(i) (2006) (“The
incorporators of an International Company shall be deemed to have agreed to become members of the
International Company, and on its registration shall be entered as such in its register of members.”);
Company Law Art. 25(4) (2005) (China) (“A limited liability company shall state the following items
in its articles of association: names of shareholders.”); Companies Act § 8(1) (2006) (U.K.) (“A
memorandum of association is a memorandum stating that the subscribers . . . (a) wish to form a
company under this Act, and (b) agree to become members of the company.”); id. § 9(1) (“The
memorandum of association must be delivered to the registrar together with an application for
registration of the company.”); Code of Obligations § 772(1) (2014) (Switz.) (“A limited liability
company is an incorporated company with separate legal personality in which one or more persons or
commercial enterprises participate.”); LLC Act § 8(1)(3) (2013) (Ger.) (“The following must be
enclosed with the application for registration: A list of shareholders signed by those applying for
registration which indicates the family name, given name, date of birth and place of residence of the
shareholders.”); Companies Act Art. 575(1) (2005) (Japan) (“In order to incorporate an (sic) General
Partnership Company, Limited Partnership Company or Limited Liability Company . . . persons who
intend to be its partners must prepare articles of incorporation which must be signed by or record the
names of and be affixed with the seals, of all partners.”); LLP Act § 6(1) (2008) (India) (“Every limited
liability partnership shall have at least two partners.”). See Shawn Bayern, Thomas Burri, Thomas D.
Grant, Daniel M. Häusermann, Florian Möslein & Richard Williams, Company Law and Autonomous
Systems: A Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and Regulators, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 135,
144 (2017) (“To summarize, an autonomous system cannot be given de facto legal personhood without
human involvement by means of a Swiss stock corporation. The corporation must have at least one
shareholder and at least one natural person acting as director. . . . A Swiss LLC must have at least one
managing officer; managing officers must be natural persons.”).
150. LLC Law § 26(1) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (allowing members to manage an LLC); § 13(3)
(allowing artificial entities to be members); RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations § 39 (2006)
(allowing management by not less than one director); RAK FTZ Standard Articles of Association ¶ 38
(recognizing that a “body corporate” may be a director); U.K., Companies Act § 155 (2006) (requiring
that a “company must have at least one director who is a natural person,” but stating that the “requirement
is met if the office of director is held by a natural person . . . by virtue of an office”). An AE could
circumvent the UK requirement either by appointing two legal person directors to outvote the human,
or by establishing an office in the controlling entity to which the algorithm could easily appoint, and
from which it could easily remove, natural person nominees.
151. Code of Obligations Art. 814(2) (2014) (Switz.) (“[A]t least one managing director must be
authorized to represent the company.”); Bayern et al., supra note 149, at 144 (“Only natural persons—
that is, humans—are eligible to be appointed to [the board of a Swiss GmbH].”); LLC Act § 6(1) (2013)
(Ger.) (“The company must have one or more directors.”), § 6(2) (“Only a natural person of full legal
capacity may be a director.”); Bayern et al., supra note 149, at 143 (noting that the statute that “allows
only natural persons to act as directors” of a German GmbHG is under constitutional attack); Company
Law Art. 51 (2005) (China) (“[A] limited liability company . . . may have an executive director and no
board of directors.”), Art. 52 (“A limited liability company, which has relatively less shareholders or is
relatively small in scale, may have 1 or 2 supervisors, and does not have to establish a board of
supervisors.”), Art. 58 (recognizing that a “one-person limited liability company” may have a “legal
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But, except in Switzerland152 and China,153 the requirements seem only
directed at assuring the presence of natural persons who can be held
accountable for the entity’s actions or failures to act, not to enable the
natural persons to exercise independent discretion or control. To illustrate,
Indian law requires that the artificial partners of an Indian limited liability
partnership designate human partners. But the only provision addressing the
function of the human partners states:
[A] designated partner shall be (a) responsible for the doing of all
acts, matters and things as are required to be done by the limited
liability partnership in respect of compliance of the provisions of this
Act including filing of any document, return, statement and the like
report pursuant to the provisions of this Act and as may be specified
in the limited liability partnership agreement; and (b) liable to all
penalties imposed on the limited liability partnership for any
contravention of those provisions.154
Those duties are all ministerial.
Except in Switzerland and China, the human representatives that the
owners must appoint appear to be mere agents. If so, algorithms could
simply hire such agents and instruct them. Except in China,155 the
representatives can be removed and replaced at will, opening the door to

person” as its shareholder); Companies Act Art. 598(1) (2005) (Japan) (juridical partners who execute
the business must appoint persons to execute their duties); LLP Act § 7(1) (2008) (India) (“[I]n case of
a limited liability partnership in which all the partners are bodies corporate . . . at least two individuals
who are partners of such limited liability partnership or nominees of such bodies corporate shall act as
designated partners.”). But see Vivian Bath, The Company Law and Foreign Investment Enterprises in
the PRC–Parallel Systems of Chinese-Foreign Regulation, 30 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 774 (2007)
(asserting that a wholly foreign owned enterprise with only one shareholder is not required to have a
supervisor).
152. Code of Obligations Art. 810(2) (2014) (Switz.) (“Subject to the reservation of the following
provisions, the managing directors have the following inalienable and irrevocable duties: 1. the overall
management of the company and issuing the required directives . . . .”); see also Bayern et al., supra
note 149, at 144.
All private law entities in Switzerland are required to have a supreme governing body.
Depending on the type of entity, the supreme governing body may be a board of directors (in
the case of a stock corporation), one or several managing officers (in the case of an LLC), or a
board of trustees (in the case of a foundation). Only natural persons — that is, humans — are
eligible to be appointed to such body.
153. Company Law Art. 52 (2005) (China) (“No director or senior manager may concurrently
work as a supervisor.”), Art. 54 (providing that the “supervisor of a company with no board of
supervisors may” check “the financial affairs of the company” and supervise “the duty-related acts of
the directors”).
154. LLP Act § 8 (2008) (India).
155. Company Law Art. 53 (2005) (China) (“Every term of office of the supervisors shall be 3
years.”).
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virtually complete de facto algorithmic control.156 As was previously
discussed, nominees who can be removed and replaced at will are
notoriously pliable.157
In combination, requiring that entities have owners and allowing
artificial entities to fill that role leaves AE initiators with essentially four
strategies for putting algorithms in control of non-U.S. entities. First, except
in the United Kingdom158 and Switzerland,159 the initiator could create two
domestic AEs, each owning and controlling the other.160 Circular ownership
would avoid the infinite regress in which each artificial owner would itself
have to have an artificial owner. But circular ownership would make it
easier for the government or others to discover the AE.161 Entity ownership
records are visible to the governments in six of the eight jurisdictions and
to the public in three of the six.162

156. Company Law Art. 51 (2005) (China) (“As for a limited liability company with relatively
less shareholders or a relatively small limited liability company, it may have an executive director and
no board of directors.”), Art. 62 (providing that a single shareholder can make decisions simply by
writing them); Code of Obligations Art. 815(1) (2014) (Switz.) (“The members’ general meeting may
remove managing directors that it has appointed at any time.”); LLC Act § 38 (2013) (Ger.) (“The
directors’ appointment may be revoked at any time without prejudice to claims for compensation
resulting from existing agreements.”); Companies Act Art. 914 viii (2005) (Japan) (“The registration of
incorporation of a Limited Liability Company shall be completed by registering . . . if the partner
representing the Limited Liability Company is a juridical person, the name and domicile of the person
who is to perform the duties of such partner.”); LLP Act § 7(2)(ii) (2008) (India) (“[A]ny partner may
become a designated partner by and in accordance with the limited liability partnership agreement and
a partner may cease to be a designated partner in accordance with limited liability partnership
agreement.”).
157. See supra notes 117–138 and accompanying text.
158. The United Kingdom Companies Act prohibits circular ownership of companies. Companies
Act § 136(1) (2006) (U.K.) (“[A] a body corporate cannot be a member of a company that is its holding
company, and . . . any allotment or transfer of shares in a company to its subsidiary is void.”).
159. Code of Obligations Art. 783 (2014) (Switz.) (prohibiting circular ownership).
160. LLC Law § 9(4)(c) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“Unless its LLC agreement provides otherwise, a
limited liability company has the power . . . to . . . purchase, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire,
own, hold, vote, [or] use . . . shares or other interests in . . . any other entity . . .”); Company Law Art.
16 (2005) (China) (“Where a company intends to invest in any other enterprise or provide guarantee for
others, it shall, according to the provisions of its articles of association, be decided at the meeting of the
board of directors or shareholders’ meeting or shareholders’ assembly.”); LLC Act § 33(2) (2013) (Ger.)
(“The company may purchase own shares for which capital contributions have been paid in full . . . ”).
Japan and India prohibit circular ownership with respect to stock companies, but have no corresponding
provision applicable to limited liability companies. Companies Act Art. 135 (2005) (Japan); Companies
Act § 149 (India). A RAK FTZ International company cannot acquire its own shares by share purchase,
RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations § 31(2006), or redemption, id. § 30, but there is no
prohibition on purchase of the shares of a subsidiary.
161. Not all circular ownership would be to facilitate AEs. Human directors or managers may
create circular ownership as a means of guaranteeing their continuation in office.
162. RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations § 25 (2006) (disclosure to government and
the public); Company Law Art. 25(4) (2005) (China) (disclosure to government); Companies Act §
116(1) (2006) (U.K.) (disclosure to government and the public); LLC Act § 40 (2013) (Ger.) (disclosure
to government and the public); Companies Act Art. 914 (2005) (Japan) (disclosure to the government);

924

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 95:887

A second strategy would be for an ownerless entity from a jurisdiction
that does not require the keeping of ownership records to own the domestic
entity.163 The principal disadvantage of this approach is that the AE dyad
would be present, and so perhaps vulnerable, in two jurisdictions.
Third, the initiator could arrange multiple entities from different
countries in circular ownership. The circle would run through jurisdictions
where the governments do not collect the identities of shareholders or
members. Because the ownership is ultimately circular, it might violate the
law in some of those countries. Even if the governments pool the ownership
information they do collect, that information would not be sufficient to
reveal the circularity of the ownership, but the circularity might still be
revealed through discovery in civil litigation.
A fourth strategy would be for the domestic entity to designate a human
to act as its nominee shareholder. As the entity’s sole shareholder, the
nominee would execute the algorithm’s instructions. The disadvantage is
that the nominee might disregard instructions or even discover and reveal
the AE’s nature.
This section has shown that AEs can control most entity types formed in
most U.S. jurisdictions. Even outside the United States, AEs could control
at least one type of entity in most jurisdictions. In some, that control could
be direct, as it would be in the United States. In others, the AE may be
dependent on nominees, may need to use multi-entity structures, or both.
Ultimately, however, AEs could exist almost anywhere in the world.
B. The Mobility Problem
Humans will have difficulty controlling AEs because AEs can migrate
across state and national borders to avoid detection and regulation. Crossborder migration can be the electronic transfer or redistribution of an
algorithm, a change in the physical location of the AE’s assets or operations,
a mere change in the entity’s registration jurisdiction, or any combination
of these.
1. Mobility of Algorithms
Algorithms are computer programs. They can move across borders as
easily as a program can be downloaded from a foreign server. Copies of an
algorithm or its components can exist in numerous jurisdictions
simultaneously.

LLP Act § 25 (2008) (India) (disclosure to the government).
163. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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Governments could seek to prevent AEs by regulating algorithms
directly and enforcing the regulations by detecting and destroying
noncompliant algorithms. But an intelligent algorithm can back itself up in
multiple jurisdictions, manage its own locations, and employ encryption to
avoid detection. To predict the degree to which the governments or the
algorithms would prevail in such a contest would require an analysis of
technology that is outside the scope of this Article. I acknowledge the
possibility that governments might be successful in regulating algorithms
directly,164 but assume for purposes of this Article that they will not.
2. Mobility of Assets and Operations
AEs have the same rights and abilities as other property owners to move
assets and operations across borders to escape regulation. But, to the extent
that an entity’s assets and operations remain in a jurisdiction, the
government has the power to seize them. As a result, the entity remains de
facto subject to the jurisdiction’s regulation. Governments regulate foreign
entities that have local assets and operations in two ways. First, the
government may enact regulations that apply extraterritorially and enforce
them by proceeding against the local assets. The U.S. government has
employed this strategy with respect to bankruptcy court jurisdiction over
debtors’ foreign assets.165 Second, the government may condition the right
to do business in the jurisdiction on compliance with the regulations. For
example, a U.S. state has the constitutional right to exclude foreign entities
from doing business within its borders,166 provided that its restrictions do
not interfere with interstate commerce.167

164. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, (2017) (speculating on the kind of regulation necessary).
165. LOPUCKI, supra note 53, at 189–92 (describing cases).
166. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 652 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. 1983) (“It has been held both
before and after the Fourteenth Amendment that a State may impose on a foreign corporation for the
privilege of doing business within its borders more onerous conditions than it imposes on domestic
companies.”).
167. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1:4 (3d
ed. 2015) (“As a consequence of being denied citizenship status, states may, as a valid exercise of their
police powers, regulate foreign corporations conducting business within their borders, provided the
regulations do not impermissibly affect commerce.”).
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Despite those theoretical possibilities, governments generally have not
sought to regulate entities incorporated elsewhere. Instead, they yield to the
entity law of the formation jurisdiction.168 U.S. states require foreign
corporations doing business within their borders to identify themselves,
designate resident agents to receive service of process, and pay fees that
approximate those for incorporation in the state.169 Those requirements are
the same, whether the jurisdiction of incorporation is in another state or
outside the country.170 The same is true in Canada and Australia.171 Within
the European Union, the right of freedom of establishment entitles an entity
formed in one member state to do business in other member states.172 A
small minority of jurisdictions do regulate the internal affairs of foreign
corporations. First, California,173 Japan,174 and India175 have adopted
versions of the pseudo-foreign corporation doctrine. That doctrine applies
the law of the jurisdiction to a foreign-incorporated company if the company
is principally located in the jurisdiction. Second, New York,176
Switzerland,177 and perhaps other jurisdictions, regulate some of the internal
affairs of foreign entities doing business within their territories. Third,
several European jurisdictions continue to apply the “real seat” doctrine.178
That doctrine requires a business to incorporate in the jurisdiction if its
administrative center is in the jurisdiction,179 and treats the business as
unincorporated if the business does not do so.180

168. Qualifying to Do Business Outside Your State, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/qualifying-do-business-outside-state-29717.html [https://perma.cc/M3KM-X69P] (last
visited Oct. 9, 2017) (“Qualification is simply a registration process that involves filing paperwork and
paying fees—similar to the procedures and fees required for incorporating your business or forming
your LLC.”).
169. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105.
170. E.g., id. § 171 (“‘Foreign corporation’ means any corporation other than a domestic
corporation . . . .”).
171. John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., The Direction of Corporate Law: The Scholars’ Perspective, 25 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 79, 91 (2000) (“Both Canada and Australia have, for example, federal systems in which
business firms incorporate under a provincial corporate law. In principle, this supplies the preconditions
for charter competition, as firms can choose between the corporate laws of different provinces.”).
172. Case C-212/97- Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECR I-1459, 2 C.M.L.R.
551 (1999).
173. Cal. Corp. Code § 2115 (2009).
174. Companies Act Art. 821(1) (2005) (Japan) (“A Foreign Company that has its head office in
Japan or whose main purpose is to conduct business in Japan may not carry out transactions continuously
in Japan.”).
175. Companies Act § 379 (2013) (India) (providing that the Companies Act applies to foreign
companies if they are at least 50 percent owned by Indian investors).
176. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1317 (2017) (“[T]he directors and officers of a foreign corporation
doing business in this state are subject, to the same extent as directors and officers of a domestic
corporation, to the provisions of . . . Section 719 (Liability of directors in certain cases).”).
177. Federal Act on Private International Law § 159 (“When the operations of a company
established under a foreign law are managed in or from Switzerland, the liability of the persons acting
on behalf of such company is governed by Swiss law.”).
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None of these regulations would meaningfully limit the ability of an AE
to operate in a jurisdiction that adopted them. For example, if a Delaware
corporation operated only in California, it would be a California pseudocorporation. California law would govern meetings of shareholders, the
election of directors, and other aspects of the relationship among
shareholders, directors, officers, and the entity.181 But those relationships
are of no importance in an algorithm-controlled entity. If the AE had
directors and shareholders at all, they would be nominees merely executing
the algorithm’s instructions. Delaware law would continue to govern the AE
in the most important respects—disclosure of beneficial ownership
information.
Similarly, if all operations of a Delaware-incorporated AE were in
Germany, the arrangement would facially violate Germany’s requirement
that a company be incorporated at its real seat.182 But the most-favorednation clause of the U.S.-German treaty probably entitles Delaware entities
to essentially the same rights as those from EU countries.183 The latter are
not required to comply with the real seat doctrine under German law. In a
landmark decision, the European Court of Justice held that an entity that
was formed in the United Kingdom, but which had no operations in the
United Kingdom, had the right to conduct its only business in Denmark
despite Denmark law to the contrary. The court said:
It is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 [of the EC Treaty] for a Member
State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in
accordance with the law of another Member State in which it has its

178. E.g., Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws, 36 INT’L
L. 1015, 1016 (2002) (“[T]he real seat doctrine . . . is applied in one form or another by the majority of
the Member States of the European Union.”).
179. CARSTEN GERNER-BEUERLE ET AL., STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 231
(2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/board/2013-study-analysis_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L9EW-5GKT] (“Countries following the real seat doctrine, on the other hand, traditionally
required from their own companies that they maintain their central administration within their
jurisdiction.”).
180. Luca Cerioni, The “Uberseering” Ruling: The Eve of a “Revolution” for the Possibilities of
Companies’ Migration Throughout the European Community?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 117, 119 (2003)
(“States currently using the ‘real seat’ criteria either do not recognize the legal capacity of companies
formed under foreign legal systems but having their central management and control . . . within their
jurisdictions, unless those companies re-incorporate according to their national provisions, or they
consider such companies as unincorporated entities.”).
181. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b) (2009).
182. Ebke, supra note 178, at 1022 (“[A] corporation having its seat in Germany is required to
incorporate under German law.”).
183. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Ger.-U.S., art. XXV, ¶ 2, cl. 2, Oct. 20,
1954.
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registered office but in which it conducts no business where the
branch is intended to enable the company in question to carry on its
entire business in the State in which that branch is to be created, while
avoiding the need to form a company there, thus evading application
of the rules governing the formation of companies which, in that
State, are more restrictive as regards the paying up of a minimum
share capital.184
In other words, even in the most egregious circumstances, an EU business
can incorporate anywhere in the EU and be bound only by the entity law of
its place of incorporation, thus avoiding the entity law of the place where it
does business.
This EU “right to freedom of establishment” applies only in favor of
entities formed in European Economic Area (EEA) and other-treaty
jurisdictions. Thus, an entity formed in a non-EU, non-other-treaty
jurisdiction would not have the right to maintain its center of operations in
Germany.185 But it could acquire that right simply by moving its place of
incorporation to an EU or other-treaty jurisdiction.
Thus, while the pseudo-foreign corporation doctrine, the real seat
doctrine, and other similar regulations can, in some instances, limit AEs’
abilities to center their operations in particular jurisdictions, the limitations
are of limited practical importance. Under current law, an AE can center its
operations in almost any jurisdiction without incorporating in that
jurisdiction.
3. Mobility of Entities
The ability to change an entity’s registration jurisdiction is important
because the place of registration determines the applicable entity law.186
This basic principle of international cooperation is often conflated with the
“internal affairs doctrine” and the two are then misleadingly described as
regulating only the relationships among the corporation and its
shareholders, officers, and directors.
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a

184. Centros Ltd., supra note 47.
185. Case C-378/10 VALE Építési (2012).
186. For example, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13.05 (2016) provides:
A foreign corporation shall not be denied authority by reason of the fact that the laws of the
state under which such corporation is organized governing its organization and internal affairs
differ from the laws of this State, and nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to
authorize this State to regulate the organization or the internal affairs of such corporation.
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corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships
among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors,
and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced
with conflicting demands. States normally look to the State of a
business’ incorporation for the law that provides the relevant
corporate governance general standard of care.187
In fact, the conflated doctrines regulate rights of contract creditors,188 tort
creditors,189 employees,190 the government,191 the public,192 and probably
other corporate stakeholders.193
Most importantly for present purposes, the incorporation state’s entity
law determines who may initiate an entity, what information an initiator
must divulge, what portion of that information will be made public, the
extent to which humans must participate in controlling the entity, and which

187. Vaughn v. LJ Int’l, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations
omitted).
188. That is, entity law shields entities against contract claims. N. Am. Catholic Educ.
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007) (holding that the “creditors of a
Delaware corporation in the ‘zone of insolvency’ may not assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary
duty against the corporation’s directors”).
189. E.g., Mucciarelli, supra note 48, at 457 n.163 (“Veil piercing is considered in many
[European Union] Member States as part of the lex societatis and, consequently, governed by the state
of incorporation.”); Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831, 840 n.17 (D.
Del. 1978) (“Delaware courts which have considered the question of whether a parent corporation should
be subjected to liability for a subsidiary’s obligations have applied Delaware law, even in the case of
foreign subsidiaries.”).
190. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1673, 1675 (2002) (noting that the German system of corporate governance grants formal
participatory rights to employees); id. at 1683–84 (noting that the Japanese system of corporate
governance grants information rights that approximate the same results).
191. For example, Germany is unable to effectively impose the real seat doctrine and U.S
jurisdictions cannot revoke the charters of corporations from other states. E.g., In re Blixseth, 484 B.R.
360, 369–70 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (“[J]urisdiction to dissolve a corporation rests only in the courts of
the state of incorporation.”); Young v. JCR Petroleum, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 889, 892 (W. Va. 1992) (quoting
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2734 (1986)) (“[T]he courts of one state do not have the power to
dissolve a corporation created by the laws of another state.”).
192. See, e.g., Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative
Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1484–85 (2002):
[I]f a company is incorporated in State X (where the law mandates that directors’ sole duty is
to maximize shareholder value), but has its primary operations in State Y (which is solicitous
of broader community interests), State Y arguably has an interest in ensuring that directors
consider the interests of other corporate constituents, such as employees and community
members.
193. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH, 2002 E.C.R.
I-9919, I-9949 (Nov. 5, 2002) (“[T]he fundamental weakness of the incorporation principle [is that it]
fails to take account of the fact that a company’s incorporation and activities also affect the interests of
third parties and of the State in which the company has its actual centre of administration.”).
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humans are considered adequate as controllers.194 Those are the issues that
would determine the viability of an AE in the jurisdiction.
Changing an entity’s registration jurisdiction changes the applicable
entity law. After an entity ceases to be registered in a jurisdiction, the
jurisdiction may continue to regulate the entity’s operations remaining in
the jurisdiction, but is not likely to regulate the entity itself.195 Thus, an AE
can escape regulation by its registration jurisdiction simply by changing it.
Entities can change their incorporation jurisdictions in at least four ways,
none of which requires movement of assets or operations. First, an entity
can incorporate a second entity in the destination jurisdiction, transfer its
assets to that entity, and then dissolve itself (hereinafter Sale of Assets). One
strength of this method is that neither the entity types nor the jurisdictions
matter, so long as the jurisdictions do not prohibit sales of assets. A second
strength is that the transaction may be invisible. The assets need not move
and the transaction may not be required to be recorded in any public or
government records. Entity law sometimes authorizes this technique,196
sometimes re-characterizes it as a merger,197 but rarely prohibits it.198 The
weaknesses of this method are that asset sales may have adverse tax or other
legal consequences and some assets may not be readily assignable or may
be assignable only at substantial expense or after substantial delay.199 For
those reasons, entities usually prefer to change their incorporation
jurisdictions by other methods.
Second, an entity can incorporate a second entity in the destination
jurisdiction and merge into that entity (hereinafter Merger). This method is
commonly available and used in all or substantially all U.S. jurisdictions.200
The statutes of both jurisdictions must allow the merger.
Third, the entity laws of most U.S. jurisdictions and some foreign
jurisdictions allow foreign entities to convert to domestic entities if the

194. Supra notes 126–125 and accompanying text.
195. The United Kingdom is an exception. See Mucciarelli, supra note 45, at 429 (noting that
“according to English law a transfer abroad of the registered office is simply impossible”).
196. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (2010) (authorizing sale of all or substantially all assets).
197. Arrowhead Capital Fin., Ltd. v. Seven Arts Entm’t, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 6512 (KPF), 2016 WL
4991623, at *10–13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2016) (recharacterizing asset transfers as mergers); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1001(a) (“A [sale of all or substantially all assets] constituting a conversion . . . is subject to the
provisions [governing conversions] and not this section.”).
198. Jurisdictions that prohibit foreign investment may have such prohibitions.
199. Robert C. Art, Conversion and Merger of Disparate Business Entities, 76 WASH. U. L. REV.
349, 369–72 (2001) (describing a variety of such problems).
200. The Model Business Corporation Act, which has been adopted in more than half of U.S. states,
provides that “[o]ne or more domestic business corporations may merge with one or more domestic or
foreign business corporations or eligible entities pursuant to a plan of merger.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 11.02(a) (2016).
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foreign entity law permits (hereinafter Conversion).201 Typically, these
jurisdictions also allow domestic entities to convert to foreign entities if the
foreign entity law permits. For example, Delaware allows a “foreign
corporation” to “convert to a corporation of this State”202 merely by filing
an election to do so. The Delaware corporation thus created is “deemed to
be the same entity as the converting other entity.”203 The “converting other
entity” is “not required to wind up its affairs.”204 But its continuance is only
“in the form of a corporation of this state.”205 In some jurisdictions, this
method is referred to as “domestication.”206
Fourth, Delaware and Nevada offer domestication procedures of a
different type. They allow non-U.S. entities to become Delaware or Nevada
entities while remaining in existence under non-U.S. law (hereinafter
Domestication).207 To illustrate, the Delaware statute provides:
[T]he corporation and such non-United States entity shall, for all
purposes of the laws of the State of Delaware, constitute a single
entity formed, incorporated, created or otherwise having come into
being, as applicable, and existing under the laws of the State of
Delaware and the laws of such foreign jurisdiction.208
The effect of this type of domestication is to confer dual domicile on the
entity. That is, under Delaware law, the entity has the option to renounce
either domicile and continue to exist under the laws of the other domicile.209

201. See, e.g., VICTORIA APPLEWHITE, MISS. SEC’Y STATE OFFICE DOMESTICATION AND
CONVERSION OF BUSINESS ENTITIES 3 (2012), http://www.sos.ms.gov/Policy-Research/Docu
ments/5Background.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB9Z-TLE4] (defining “domestication” as “a procedure
whereby a foreign corporation discontinues its incorporation under the laws of the foreign state and
becomes incorporated under the laws of the subject state or vice versa” and reporting that “[t]hirty [U.S.
states] in total provide for domestication of corporations”).
202. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 265(a)–(b) (2012).
203. Id. tit. 8, § 265(f).
204. Id. tit. 8, § 265(g).
205. Id.
206. E.g., Fisher v. Tails, Inc., 767 S.E. 2d 710, 712–14 (Va. 2015) (discussing domestication under
Virginia law).
207. NEV. REV. STAT. § 92A.270 (2016) provides:
If, following domestication, an undomesticated organization that has become domesticated
pursuant to this section continues its existence in the foreign country or foreign jurisdiction in
which it was existing immediately before the domestication, the domestic entity and the
undomesticated organization are for all purposes a single entity formed, incorporated,
organized or otherwise created and existing pursuant to the laws of this State and the laws of
the foreign country or other foreign jurisdiction.
208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 388(j) (2008).
209. An entity with dual domicile can “transfer to . . . any foreign jurisdiction and, in connection
therewith, may elect to continue its existence as a corporation of this State.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
390(a) (2012).
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From the viewpoint of an AE, such dual domicile provides a means of
speedy exit from a foreign jurisdiction that turns hostile. The foreign entity
already exists under Delaware law.
To estimate the rough proportion of jurisdictions to which AEs could
emigrate, I surveyed the laws of the eight representative foreign
jurisdictions on which I reported in Part II.A.5. For each, I determined first
whether foreign entities could become domestic entities (hereinafter
immigration) by each of four methods (Asset Sale, Merger, Conversion, and
Domestication) and second whether domestic entities could become foreign
entities by each of those methods (hereinafter emigration). Table 2 shows
the results for Asset Sales, Mergers, and Conversions. Domestications are
not shown because none of the eight jurisdictions allow them.
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Table 2. Authorized Methods for Changing Incorporation Jurisdiction
(ordered as in Table 1)
Jurisdiction

Entity type

Asset Sale

Merger

Conversion

Cayman
Islands

Companies
and LLCs

In and out

In and out

In and out

RAK FTZ

Offshore Co.

In and out

No in or out

No in or out

United
Kingdom

Companies

In and out, but
In and out by
only with EEA,
absorption
treaty countries

China

Foreign and
domestic
companies

No in or out

Germany

Stock or
GmbH

Japan

Stock or LLC

India

LLP

Switzerland

Companies

No in or out

In but not out210
only with EEA,
treaty countries
No in or out

In and out, but In and out only
In and out by
only with EEA, with EEA, treaty
absorption
treaty countries
countries
No in or out

No in or out

In and out by Two step in and
absorption
out
In and out by
absorption

In and out

No in or out
Two step in and
out
Out but not in

“In” means a foreign entity can become a domestic entity of the type. “Out”
means that a domestic entity of the type can become a foreign entity.
“Absorption” is merger by absorption, a doctrine similar to de fact merger in
the United States. The sale of assets for stock is regulated as if it were a merger.
“Two step” refers to the necessity to convert an Indian LLP to an Indian
company before it can merge or convert to foreign jurisdictions.

Table 2 shows that six of the eight jurisdictions (75 percent) provide at
least one method by which entities can immigrate and emigrate. Only Japan
and China allow none. Although Japanese companies can merge with and
convert to other types of Japanese companies,211 foreign companies cannot

210. See Federico M. Mucciarelli, Company ‘Emigration’ and EC Freedom of Establishment:
Daily Mail Revisited, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 267, 285 (2008) (stating with respect to England that
“the transfer abroad of the registered office does not shift the connecting factor and the applicable law
does not change”).
211. Companies Act Art. 743 (2005) (Japan) (conversion), Art. 748 (merger).
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merge with or convert to or from Japanese companies.212
Chinese entities cannot sell their Chinese assets abroad,213 merge with
foreign entities,214 or convert to foreign entities. The “merger” of Chinese
and foreign entities allowed under recently adopted regulations actually
authorizes only acquisitions of Chinese companies in narrow circumstances.
The acquired company would remain incorporated in China.215
The RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations do not provide for
foreign, or even domestic, mergers or conversions. Nor do they, however,
prohibit Asset Sale. From that lack of prohibition and the fact that the
Regulations contemplate takeovers216 I infer asset sales are permitted.217
Because the RAK FTZ Offshore company could be either the buyer or the
seller of the assets, the Regulations do leave open a path by which AEs could
migrate in or out of RAK FTZ Offshore companies.
The five remaining jurisdictions offer entity migration in and out of the
jurisdictions’ entity laws by Merger, Conversion, or Asset Sale. The
Cayman Islands LLC Act is similar to U.S. LLC laws, and makes the rights
to Asset Sale,218 Merger,219 or Conversion220 across international borders

212. Companies Act Art. 1 (2005) (Japan) (defining “company”), Art. 2 (defining “foreign
company”). Japan does allow “triangular mergers” between Japanese and foreign companies that allow
foreign companies to acquire Japanese companies, but the acquired companies remain Japanese. Id. Art.
749 (2005) (Japan) (stock company), Art. 751 (membership company); William R. Huss et al., Japan’s
New Triangular Merger Rules—Acquisition of Japanese Companies Through Share Exchanges, CLIENT
ALERT (Apr. 25, 2007) 1, http://perma.cc/7UEF-HX47 (describing transactions in which the target
companies remain Japanese).
213. Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Art. 19 (2000) (China) (“The foreign investor
may remit abroad legitimate profits earned from an enterprise with sole foreign investment, other
legitimate income and funds obtained after liquidation of the enterprise.”).
214. As to domestic entities, see Company Law Art. 173 (2005) (China) (“The merger of a
company may be achieved by way of absorption or consolidation.”), Art. 2 (“The term ‘company’ as
mentioned in this Law refers to a limited liability company or a joint stock limited company established
within the territory of the People’s Republic of China in accordance with the provisions of this law.”).
As to wholly foreign-owned entities, see Provisions on M&A of a Domestic Enterprise by Foreign
Investors Art. 2 (2009) (China) (allowing only mergers and asset sales resulting in “foreign investment
enterprises”).
215. Provisions on M&A of a Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors Art. 27 (2009) (China)
(allowing purchase of a domestic company by a surviving “overseas” company, but only if the overseas
company is listed and the listing place has “a sound management system on securities exchange”).
216. RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations §§ 110–16 (2006).
217. If asset sales to or from RAK FTZ companies were not permitted, an entity that acquired full
ownership of one could not integrate the entity’s assets with those of the RAK FTZ company.
218. LLC Law § 9(4) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“[A] limited liability company has the power to do all
things necessary or convenient to carry on its business or affairs, including, without limitation, power to
. . . purchase, . . . real or personal property . . . wherever located; . . . sell . . . all or any part of its property;
. . . purchase . . . shares or other interests in . . . any other entity.”).
219. LLC Law § 51(1) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“One or more limited liability companies may merge
or consolidate with one or more foreign entities.”).
220. LLC Law § 54(1) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“Any foreign entity may apply to the Registrar to be
registered by way of continuation as a limited liability company in the Islands.”); id. § 55(1) (providing
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both express and reciprocal.
Swiss law allows both “absorption by immigration”—purchase of a
foreign company’s assets—and “combination by immigration” —merger of
a foreign company into a Swiss company.221 It also allows the reverse of
those two processes—“absorption by emigration” and “combination by
emigration.”222 It allows conversion out,223 but makes no mention of
conversion in.
In accord with the EU’s cross-border merger directive,224 EU members
Germany and the United Kingdom have adopted statutes permitting
immigration and emigration by Merger or Sale of Assets,225 but only to and
from European Economic Area countries,226 the United States,227 and othertreaty-protected nations. The geographical limitations are probably
unimportant because AEs from other countries could migrate in and out of
the EU through U.S. or other jurisdictions. Although neither German nor
U.K. statutes provide for Conversions, the European Court of Justice has
held that EU member states must allow them.228
The cross-border merger provisions of the Indian Companies Act (2013)
became effective in 2017. They expressly allow Indian companies to merge

for deregistration of Cayman Islands LLCs that qualify and apply for “continuation as a foreign entity
under the laws of any jurisdiction outside the islands”).
221. Federal Act on Private International Law Art. 163 (2014) (Switz.) (“A Swiss company may
acquire a foreign company (absorption by immigration) or form together with a foreign company a new
Swiss company (combination by immigration).”).
222. Federal Act on Private International Law Art. 163a(1) (2014) (Switz.) (“A Swiss company
may acquire a foreign company (absorption by immigration) or form together with a foreign company a
new Swiss company (combination by immigration), provided the law governing the foreign company
permits such a merger and all the requirements of such law are met.”), id. Art. 163b (“A foreign company
may acquire a Swiss company (absorption by emigration) or form together with a Swiss company a new
foreign company (combination by emigration).”).
223.Federal Act on Private International Law Art. 163(1) (2014) (Switz.) (“A Swiss company may
subject itself to a foreign law without going into a liquidation and a re-establishment, provided it meets
the requirements of Swiss law and continues to exist under the foreign law.”).
224. Directive 2005/56/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on
Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1 [hereinafter Cross-Border
Merger Directive] (“The laws of the Member States are to allow the cross-border merger of a national
limited liability company with a limited liability company from another Member State if the national
law of the relevant Member States permits mergers between such types of company.”).
225. Transformation Act § 122a (2011) (Ger.) (defining cross-border merger), § 122(b) (making
all “companies limited by shares” eligible for cross-border mergers); U.K., Companies (Cross-Border
Mergers) Regulations 2007.
226. Transformation Act § 122a (2011) (Ger.) (extending cross-border merger participation to
companies subject to the law of European Economic Area country); U.K., Companies (Cross-Border
Mergers) Regulations 2007.
227. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Germany-U.S., art. XXV, para. 5, cl. 2, Oct.
20, 1954.
228. EU members are required to allow conversions by the Third Chamber of the European Court
of Justice’s decision in VALE Építési, Case C-378/10 (2012).
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with foreign companies by consolidation or absorption.229 Indian companies
are not, however, a hospitable environment for AEs because Indian
companies must be governed by human boards of directors.230 Indian LLPs
provide a more hospitable environment, but the LLP Act does not expressly
provide for the merger of LLPs with foreign entities.231 LLPs could,
nevertheless, migrate to foreign entities in a two-step process. The LLP
would first convert to an Indian company, and the Indian company would
then convert to the foreign entity.232
The results of the eight-jurisdiction survey summarized in Table 2
suggest that probably most jurisdictions worldwide expressly authorize and
seek to facilitate entity-law shopping. The two survey jurisdictions that
meaningfully restrict shopping—China and Japan—appear to view entity
law as a means of regulating foreign investment rather than as a source of
government revenues or a means of attracting capital. But if an AE needed
to be governed by the entity laws of one of those jurisdictions, it could
migrate in by contributing assets to an AE there and migrate out by selling
the assets and transferring the proceeds from the jurisdiction.
Multi-step conversions, such as the Indian-LLP-to-foreign-company
conversion previously described, are legal strategies developed by lawyers
to facilitate entity law shopping. They are common in other jurisdictions.233
For example, a German law firm offers these alternatives for merging a
German company with an entity that does not qualify for foreign merger
under the Transformation Act because it is incorporated in a non-European

229. Companies Act § 234(2) (2013) (India) (“Subject to the provisions of any other law for the
time being in force, a foreign company, may with the prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India, merge
into a company registered under this Act or vice versa.”); KPMG INTERNATIONAL, TAXATION OF
CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS INDIA 3 (2014), https://home.kpmg.com/co
ntent/dam/kpmg/pdf/2014/05/india-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/A52S-TXT] (“The Companies Act,
2013, partially repeals the Companies Act, 1956. Restructuring provisions under the new law have yet
not been made effective. However, these provisions, once effective, will permit, among other things, the
merger of an Indian company with a foreign company, which was not previously allowed.”).
230. Companies Act § 149(1) (2013) (India) (“Every company shall have a Board of Directors
consisting of individuals as directors . . . .”).
231. See generally LLP Act (2008) (India).
232. Conversion to an Indian company would be accomplished by registration of the LLP under
the Companies Act. Companies Act § 366(1) (2013) (India) (“For the purposes of this Part [Companies
Authorized to Register under this Act], the word ‘company’ includes any . . . limited liability partnership
. . . which applies for registration under this Part.”).
233. For example, the drafters of the Model Entity Transactions Act observe that:
[D]uring the past decade, restructuring transactions by and among all of the various types of
entities began to occur with increased frequency. Because of a lack of clear statutory authority
in most states, these restructuring transactions have often been completed in two or three
indirect steps rather than directly in a single transaction.
MODEL ENTITY TRANSACTION ACT 1 prefatory n. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). See also Art, supra note 199,
at 369 (describing three strategies by which a partnership can become a corporation or an LLC without
benefit of statutory authority).
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jurisdiction:
The first option is to transfer all assets and liabilities to the other
company and subsequently dissolve the transferor. The second
alternative is to transfer all interests in a German partnership to the
foreign company. In a third option, the statutory seat of one of the
companies can be transferred to the other jurisdiction and the
subsequent merger will then be deemed to take place under one
national law.234
The availability of such strategies are often difficult to predict because they
require imagination and are sensitive to practical limitations.235
Because entities can change their governing laws so easily, regulations
designed to discover, control, or prevent AEs could not be effective until
substantially all jurisdictions adopted them.236 Until then, AEs could assume
the nationality of the least regulated jurisdiction while continuing to operate
throughout the world—just as has occurred with other kinds of entity-based
crime.
C. The Detection Problem
To regulate AEs, the legal system must be capable of detecting them in
jurisdictions throughout the world. The method currently proposed for
detecting the persons behind terrorist and other criminal enterprises is
probably also the method that could best detect AEs. As discussed in this
section, that method is for chartering governments to require that entities
disclose their “beneficial owners”—the humans who ultimately own and
control the entities, directly or indirectly. That requirement would put each
AE to a choice. The AE would have to either admit it is algorithmically
controlled or fraudulently report some human or humans as its beneficial
owner. Criminal investigators could then ferret out the AEs by assessing the
plausibility that the humans disclosed by suspects are the suspect’s actual
controllers. In the analogous situation with criminal enterprises,
investigators report that, when confronted, the “front men” usually fold

234. MARTIN IMHOF, CROSS-BORDER MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN GERMANY: A TRANSACTION
GUIDE FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS 18 (2015), https://www.heuking.de/fileadmin/DATEN/Dokumente/
Internationales/Transaction_Guide_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX7H-T92K].
235. See, e.g., Art, supra note 199, at 369–72 (describing some practical difficulties with strategic,
multi-step conversions in the United States).
236. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 2, at 91 (“For a corporate law to be truly mandatory, it must
be adopted by all fifty states and the District of Columbia, because firms can change their domicile.”).
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easily and confess.237
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body
established in 1989 to combat “money laundering, terrorist financing and
other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.”238
FATF’s thirty-seven members include the United States and the
governments of all of the other leading financial powers.239 FATF has
recommended the disclosure and verification of beneficial owners,240 and
the Obama administration supported legislation that would have compelled
disclosure for entities chartered in the United States.241 But after a decade,
the legislation has not been adopted. The Trump administration has not yet
taken a position on it.
At present, governments collect widely differing types and amounts of
information regarding the entities they charter. The information collected is
referred to as the “registry.” Investigators of entity misuse report that
registries are “generally the most valuable and accessible sources of
information for investigations.”242 Investigators use the registry information
to identify the humans operating behind the entities, that is, the entities’
beneficial owners.
In its first three subsections, this section distinguishes three kinds of
incorporation information that are, or might be collected. They are
incorporator information, owner and director information, and beneficial
owner information. The final subsection contrasts the information required
to be collected during Delaware incorporation with beneficial owner
information. It then briefly describes a recently published empirical study
showing the ease with which initiators can—despite international standards
to the contrary—form entities through corporate service providers
throughout the world without furnishing meaningful proof of identity.

237. EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., THE PUPPET MASTERS: HOW THE CORRUPT USE
LEGAL STRUCTURES TO HIDE STOLEN ASSETS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 63 (2011), available at
https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/puppetmastersv1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S86Z-ZHGX]
[hereinafter PUPPET MASTERS] (“[F]ront men [, as distinguished from professional service providers,]
usually give up, confess, and cooperate when the police come after them.”).
238. Who we are, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ [https://p
erma.cc/PN2S-4AVG] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
239. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF Members and Observers,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147 [https://perma.cc/88D7-Z8T6] (last
visited Oct. 11, 2017).
240. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
241. Caroline Atkinson, Beneficial Ownership Legislation Proposed, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 4,
2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/04/04/beneficial-ownership-legislation-proposal [https:
//perma.cc/H7V3-3T25] (“This proposal would require the Internal Revenue Service to collect
information on the beneficial owner of any legal entity organized in any state, and would allow law
enforcement to access that information.”).
242. PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 237, at 70.
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1. Incorporators
Registries charter entities on written request. For lack of a better word, I
refer to the person who formally requests the entity’s formation as the
“incorporator,” regardless of the registered entity type. The incorporator
may or may not be the “initiator” who set the entity formation process in
motion.
Corporate service providers are private businesses that form entities for
initiators or guide initiators through the entity formation process. Corporate
service providers include companies formed specifically to provide those
services as well as law firms, accountants, and notaries. Corporate service
providers may serve as incorporators, provide nominee shareholders and
directors, file annual reports, and pay fees on behalf of their clients. As a
result, government registries may have no contact with the initiators and
receive no information about them. The corporate service providers may or
may not have received and retained information about their clients. If the
corporate service providers are attorneys, the information retained may or
may not be protected by attorney-client privilege. 243
Some corporate service providers form companies on their own
initiative, with the intention of later selling them. Those companies are
referred to as “shelf companies.”244 Anyone can form and sell shelf
companies. U.S. law does not require sellers to obtain or verify the buyer’s
identity or keep records of the sale. If the seller does not, the company is
anonymous.245
2. Owners and Directors
Some registries, particularly outside the United States, contain
ownership information.246 Typically, that information is the names and
addresses of the shareholders of a corporation or the interest holders in a

243. Id. at 94 (noting that “almost all of the investigators interviewed” in a study of the corrupt use
of legal structures mentioned “attorney-client privilege” as an impediment to obtaining information).
244. Id. at 37.
245. Business Formation and Financial Crime: Finding a Legislative Solution: Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 5 (2009) (statement of Jennifer Shasky, then
Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/testim
onies/witnesses/attachments/11/05/09/11-05-09-shasky-business-formation-financial-crime.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MK3T-7TV4] (“[C]riminals can easily throw investigators off the trail by purchasing
shelf companies and then never officially transferring the ownership. In such cases the investigation
often leads to a [dead-end] formation agent who has long ago sold the company with no records of the
purchaser and no obligation to note the ownership change.”).
246. See supra Table 1, column 4.
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limited liability company or limited partnership. Ownership information is
often less useful than one might suppose, because owners layer their
entities:
[I]f, as part of a money laundering investigation, the authorities in
Country A manage to successfully cooperate through the appropriate
formal channels with the authorities of Country B to discover the
shareholders of a corporation registered in that jurisdiction, they may
well find that the listed shareholders of that corporation are in fact
corporations registered in Countries C and D.247
Of course, when the investigators gain the cooperation of Countries C
and D, they may find that the entities formed in them are also owned by
entities registered in yet other jurisdictions. Worse yet, and probably more
likely, they may find that Countries C and D did not collect ownership
information at all. That may be the end of the investigative trail. As a
prominent prosecutor put it, “‘owner-of-record’ information . . . is of little
value from a law enforcement perspective. The owner-of-record can be
another shell company, another straw owner, an incorporation service—
anything.”248
Some registries contain director information. In some jurisdictions, those
directors must be humans, but in others they can be artificial entities.249 In
most jurisdictions, a single director is sufficient, and, as previously
discussed, directors may be mere nominees.250 As a result, information
about directors may not be information about beneficial owners.
3. Beneficial Owners
Widely accepted international standards state that “[c]ountries should
ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the
beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or
accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities.”251 The beneficial
owner is “the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls [an artificial
entity] and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction is being

247. PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 237, at 52.
248. Examining State Business Incorporation Practices, supra note 10, at 2.
249. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUST AND
COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS 12 (2006), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/M
isuse%20of%20Corporate%20Vehicles%20including%20Trusts%20and%20Company%20Services%
20Providers.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC94-2NJB] (“Nineteen of the 32 jurisdictions responding to the
survey indicated that corporations are permitted to serve as directors, whereas corporate directors are
prohibited in eight. Five jurisdictions failed to provide an answer to this item on the questionnaire.”).
250. See supra notes 117–138 and accompanying text.
251. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 43, at 22.
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conducted.”252
“Ultimately owns” in that definition is a reference to the possibility of
indirect ownership.253 A person who owns the shares or interests of an entity
is referred to as a direct owner. For example, if N is a natural person who
owns shares or interests in A, an artificial entity, N is a direct owner with
respect to A. A person who does not own the shares or interests of an entity,
but owns the shares or interests of an entity that does, is referred to as an
indirect owner. If A in the preceding example owns shares or interests in B,
a second artificial entity, and B owns shares or interest in C, a third artificial
entity, then (1) B is a direct owner of C and (2) N and A are each indirect
owners of C.
The FATF definition—which does not contemplate AEs—states
unequivocally that the term “beneficial owner” refers to natural persons:
“[A] beneficial owner is always a natural person—a legal person cannot by
definition, be a beneficial owner. The definition therefore speaks of
‘ultimate’ control: A legal person can never be the ultimate controller—
ownership by a legal person is itself always controlled by a natural
person.”254
Persons can control artificial entities by means other than share
ownership. For example, a nonprofit corporation may have no shareholders,
interest holders, or members. If such a corporation’s directors elect their
own successors, the directors control the corporation and are its beneficial
owners.
Non-owners can control entities in a variety of other ways. The share
owner may be a family member, a business associate, or a nominee who
follows the non-owner’s instructions out of loyalty or fear or for mutual
benefit.
More esoterically, a person might control an entity by purchasing
derivative contracts for the entity’s shares from derivative dealers or banks.
The contracts would provide that the dealers or banks will settle the
contracts by paying the person cash in amounts equal to the underlying
shares’ values at the time of settlement. In such a transaction, the dealer
“usually assumes a neutral risk position by physically acquiring the
underlying shares at the strike price of the derivative.”255 If the contract is

252. Id. at 113.
253. Id. at 113 n.52 (“‘[U]ltimately owns or controls’ and ‘ultimate effective control’ refer to
situations in which ownership/control is exercised through a chain of ownership or by means of control
other than direct control.”).
254. PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 237, at 19.
255. Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study–Disclosure,
Information and Enforcement 13 (OECD Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 7, 2013),
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performed, the person receives the profits and suffers the losses from the
share ownership. If the dealer votes the shares as the person directs, the
person may control the entity.256
Beneficial ownership is thus a difficult relationship to discover and an
even more difficult one to prove. As the following subsection demonstrates,
the only way governments can assure the existence of “accurate and timely
information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons”257 is
to place on each entity the continuing obligation to disclose its beneficial
owners. Yet, probably no American state imposes that obligation or
otherwise requires the disclosure of beneficial ownership.258
4. Disclosure in the Entity Formation Process
Governments that compete for incorporations are in a bind. FATF, other
international organizations, and perhaps the executive branch of the U.S
government are pressing for disclosure of beneficial ownership information.
But for many charter buyers, freedom from disclosure is the most important
feature of the product. Governments respond to these conflicting pressures
by appearing to collect meaningful information while not actually doing so.
This section describes the complex disclosure requirements of Delaware
law. Delaware is an important example because it is the jurisdiction most
successful in selling charters and the jurisdiction with the culture most
resistant to the collection of beneficial ownership information.259
a. Required Disclosure to Government
The Delaware General Corporation Law requires the identification of
incorporators,260 registered agents,261 and communications contacts.262

http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/50068886.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F999-RZW3].
256. See id.
257. Supra note 251 and accompanying text.
258. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN
FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 3 n.2 (2006),
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/LLCAssessment_FINAL.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/AWD2Z6J8] (“Although some states require the reporting of information on ownership, no state requires the
reporting of information on beneficial ownership.”).
259. Baradaran, supra note 79, at 526 (table showing Delaware to have the lowest FATF
compliance rate of any American state).
260. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(5) (2015) (requiring provision name and mailing address in
the certificate of incorporation)
261. Id. § 102(a)(2) (requiring provision of the name and address); id. 131(c) (requiring that the
address include street, number, city, county, and postal code).
262. Id. § 132(d) (2010) (requiring provision of name, business address, and business telephone to
the registered agent).
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None of the three is likely to be of use in discovering a Delaware
corporation’s beneficial owner.
“Any person, partnership, association or corporation . . . without regard
to such person’s or entity’s residence, domicile or state of incorporation”
may serve as an incorporator.263 Delaware law specifically contemplates
that the incorporator may be acting on behalf of someone else264 but does
not require disclosure of that person’s identity to anyone, even the
incorporator. Thus, anyone, including a corporate service provider, can be
the incorporator.265 The certificate of incorporation, a document filed with
the state, must contain the name and a mailing address for the
incorporator.266 Upon filing of the certificate, the incorporator becomes “a
body corporate.”267 Nothing in Delaware law requires that the incorporator
know the identity of the corporation’s beneficial owner.
Every corporation is required to have a registered agent268 and a
registered office269 in Delaware. Because the corporation itself can be the
registered agent, the requirement collapses to the requirement of a registered
office. The office must be “generally open.” The corporation must disclose
its registered agent, registered office, and a street address for the registered
office in its certificate of incorporation.270 The resident agents of most
corporations are corporate service providers, each of whom may act on
behalf of thousands of corporations. Nothing in Delaware law requires that
the resident agent know the identity of the corporation’s beneficial owner.
Every corporation is required to disclose:
to its registered agent and update from time to time as necessary the
name, business address and business telephone number of a natural
person who is an officer, director, employee, or designated agent of
the corporation, who is then authorized to receive communications
from the registered agent.271

263. Id. § 101(a).
264. Id. § 108(d) (2014) (stating that “if any incorporator is not available to act, any person for
whom or on whose behalf the incorporator was acting” may act).
265. Brett Melson, DELAWARE CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, https://www.delawarein
c.com/blog/Delaware-certificate-of-incorporation/ (“Harvard Business Services, Inc. is the incorporator,
on behalf of all our clients, for the companies we file.”).
266. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (a)(5) (2015).
267. Id. § 106.
268. Id. § 132(a) (2010).
269. Id. § 131(a) (2011).
270. Id. § 131(c) (2011) (street address).
271. Id. § 132(d) (2010).
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That natural person is referred to as the “communications contact.”272 The
communications contact may be a nominee, hired indirectly by a beneficial
owner who remains anonymous. Nothing in Delaware law requires that the
communications contact know the identity of the beneficial owner.
The principal function of a registered agent is to receive service of
process. Upon receipt, the registered agent forwards the process to the
communications contact. If the communications contact is not the beneficial
owner, the communications contact ordinarily would forward the process to
the beneficial owner. The forwarding may be accomplished in a manner that
authorities cannot track. For example, it may be emailed through an
anonymizer or posted to a website. Alternatively, the communications
contact may be an attorney with authority to defend the litigation. Nothing
in Delaware law regulates the manner in which the communications contact
deals with process or communicates with the beneficial owner.
Arguably, a Delaware corporation must keep a stock ledger and prepare
a list of stockholders prior to every meeting of shareholders.273 But the
corporation keeps the ledger or list. Only the corporation’s stockholders or
directors have the right to inspect either.274 Nothing in Delaware law
requires disclosure of the stock ledger or stock list to any other person.
Delaware corporations must file an annual franchise tax report.275 Each
must be signed by a “proper officer duly authorized so to act” or by any of
its directors, listing the person’s “official title.”276 The report must include
the “location of the principal place of business of the corporation, which
shall include the street, number, city, state or foreign country.”277 Aside
from initial reports and reports filed in conjunction with dissolution, each
report must list at least one director278 and, in Delaware, directors must be
“natural persons.”279 The statute does not explain how Delaware interprets
this requirement in the case of a corporation that has no directors, such as
BA 230 Corporation.280 The report is signed under penalty of perjury.281

272. Id. §132(d) (2010).
273. Rainbow Nav., Inc. v. Pan Ocean Nav., Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Del. 1987), overruled on
other grounds Pogue v. Hybrid Energy, Inc., No. 11563-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118, at *11 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 5, 2016). (“We find it implicit in Sections 219 and 220 that Delaware corporations have an
affirmative duty to maintain a stock ledger.”).
274. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c) (2017) (stockholder lists), id. § 220 (2010) (stockholder
inspection), and id. § 221 (bondholders do not have inspection rights absent certificate of incorporation
provisions granting them).
275. Id. tit. 8, § 502(a) (2017).
276. Id.
277. Id. § 502(a)(3) (2017).
278. Id. § 502(a)(4) (2017).
279. Id. § 141(a) (2016).
280. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
281. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 502(b) (2017).
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For 2016, I completed a Delaware online annual franchise tax report for
BA 230 Corporation that did not require the name of a director. Delaware
accepted my payment and, as of August 2017, the Delaware website
continues to show BA 230 Corporation’s status as Good Standing.282
The effect of this disclosure regime is that the Delaware registry will
contain the name and mailing address of an incorporator, the name and street
address of the a registered agent, the street address of the corporation’s
principal place of business, and perhaps the name and street address of an
officer or director. None may have any idea who the beneficial owners are
or know how to locate them.283
b. Required Disclosure to Corporate Service Providers
Internationally accepted standards require that corporate service
providers collect and retain proof of identity, such as a passport or other
photo ID, with regard to their customers.284 Of course, the customers are not
necessarily the beneficial owners of the entities formed. But if corporate
services providers actually collected and retained the required information,
that information could serve as a starting point for investigators seeking to
discover the beneficial owners.
A group of researchers led by Professor J.C. Sharman conducted
experiments to determine the corporate service providers’ actual practices.
The group sent 7,462 requests for anonymous incorporation to 3,773
corporate service providers in 181 countries. Based on the responses, they
concluded that “[i]nternational laws requiring customer identification to
form shell companies are not effective. Almost half of the companies we
approached did not ask for proper identification, and twenty-two percent did
not require any identity documents.”285 The “proper identification” to which
the researchers were referring, is “government-issued photo identification,
whether notarized or certified.”286 They concluded that “[o]n the whole,
forming an anonymous shell company is as easy as ever, despite increased
regulations following September 11.”287

282. DEPARTMENT OF STATE: DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, https://icis.corp.delaware.gov
/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx [https://perma.cc/TH37-H8LZ] (last visited Aug. 16, 2017).
283. Baradaran, supra note 79, at 507 (noting “the use of ‘formal nominees’ in identity reporting
requirements”).
284. Id. at 508 (discussing the requirement of some form of identification to conduct certain
transactions, such as a notarized passport copy and certified utility bill, to prohibit anonymous accounts
or accounts in obviously fictitious names).
285. Id. at 527 (emphasis omitted).
286. Id. at 513.
287. Id. at 478.
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In an earlier experiment, Sharman had emailed fifty-four corporate
service providers in twenty-two countries in an effort to form entities and
obtain bank accounts for a fictitious “international consulting” business,
without furnishing notarized or certified proof of his identity.288 Forty-five
returned valid replies.289 Of the forty-five, twenty-eight (62 percent) said
they required notarized or certified proof of his identity.290 Seventeen (31
percent of fifty-four approached) “were content to form the company
without any independent confirmation of identity, requiring only a credit
card and a shipping address for documents.”291 Sharman coded these
seventeen as anonymous because “credit cards can be issued for corporate
vehicles or supplied by a third party”292 who might not know the identity of
the applicant or owner. Those third parties might include issuers of storedvalue cards.
Of the seventeen willing to furnish anonymous entities, two were willing
to furnish anonymous bank accounts293 and five were willing to furnish bank
accounts without notarized identification. From among the five, Sharman
formed two anonymous entities, one with an anonymous bank account.
The first was a Seychelles company formed with a nominee director and
bearer shares.294 “The accompanying bank account was in Cyprus, picked
on the advice of the service provider because of this bank’s unfastidious
willingness to accept bearer share companies.”295 The bank did require
proof of Sharman’s identity.296
The second was “a Nevada corporation set up by a Nevada service
provider with a nominee director and nominee shareholders.”297 Sharman
notes that his name “appears nowhere on the incorporation documents.”298
The Nevada corporation was able to open an online bank account with “one
of the top five US banks.”299 Sharman reports that “[n]either the original
service provider nor the bank required more than an unnotarized scan of
[his] driver’s license (showing an outdated address).”300 Sharman then

288. J.C. Sharman, Testing the Global Financial Transparency Regime, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 981,
990–91 (2011).
289. Id. at 991.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Sharman notes that subsequent changes in these jurisdictions’ laws may have eliminated these
sources. Id. at 992, 995.
294. Id. at 995.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 995–96.
297. Id. at 996.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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opened a Somalia bank account for the corporation, again furnishing only a
copy of his corporation’s anonymous articles of incorporation and a scan of
his driver’s license with the outdated address.301
Sharman and his colleagues’ research demonstrates that, although most
corporate service providers are unwilling to assist in the formation of
anonymous entities, many are. Neither criminals nor AEs are likely to have
difficulty finding a willing corporate service provider.
Nor would it matter much if corporation service providers enforced the
international standards. Corporate service providers are merely a
convenience. Initiators can deal directly with the charter-issuing
governments and so need to meet only the governments’ less-stringent
disclosure standards. Initiators can serve as their own incorporators, hire
nominees who are not regulated corporate service providers to serve as their
incorporators, or have an entity they control serve as the incorporator. Once
an initiator has formed a company anonymously, investigators are unlikely
to be able to connect the entity to its beneficial owners using only the
information the government collected during the entity formation process.
Because the system leaves beneficial ownership information in the hands of
corporate service providers or does not collect it at all, the lack of beneficial
ownership information regarding an AE will not arouse suspicions.
III. CAN THE ENTITY SYSTEM BE FIXED?
Commentators often blithely assume that if law functions poorly, lawmakers can change it. For example, after explaining how an initiator could
confer legal personhood on an algorithm by creating and abandoning an
LLC to the algorithm’s control, Bayern asserted that “[o]f course, if
legislatures do not like this possibility they can easily amend the LLC acts
to prevent it.”302
Bayern does not suggest what the amendment would say or how it would
prevent AEs. In fact, the competition to sell charters makes these kinds of
changes in entity law impossible. Legislatures are reluctant to make changes
in entity laws that would reduce sales of the entity or make the state or
country appear business-unfriendly. Even if a legislature made the changes,
its actions would have little or no effect on outcomes. Most initiators would
buy entities with the feature they want from some other government.303
Essentially four changes in the law would be needed to prevent AEs from

301. Id.
302. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 104.
303. LoPucki, supra note 3.
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existing or control AEs if they existed. First, the law would have to authorize
the direct regulation of artificial general intelligence (AGI), by mandating
programming features and verifying their installation.304 Some consensus
exists in the AGI industry that malevolent algorithms pose a threat to
humans.305 But legal experts are just beginning to comment on the issue of
how to approach such regulation.306
Second, algorithmic control of entities would have to be prohibited. The
change is necessary to prevent algorithms—as opposed to humans using
algorithms—from engaging in criminal activity for which no human can be
held responsible and from resisting regulation by asserting the legal rights
of entities they control.
Third, as discussed in the previous section, to render AEs identifiable by
law enforcement, the law would have to require that all entities reveal their
beneficial owners.
Fourth, for the international movement of money to be traced effectively,
international cooperation would have to be automated and capable of tracing
in real time. That will require the modification of treaties.
Those changes will be difficult or impossible to make in time to prevent
catastrophe because the underlying problems—entity anonymity and the
internal affairs doctrine—are deeply embedded in the world economy.
Uprooting anonymity would not merely expose AEs. It would expose
bribery, crime, money-laundering, and terrorism. Changing the internal
affairs doctrine would fundamentally redistribute political power from
private actors to government.
Beneficial ownership disclosure is not a presently viable reform. Several
international organizations have promoted it for decades.307 Although the
European Union countries have recently begun requiring the disclosure of
beneficial owners,308 numerous countries, including the United States, have
agreed that the reform is necessary, but have not made it. Because an entity
can incorporate anywhere and do business anywhere else, entities that do

304. See, e.g., Steve Omohundro, Autonomous Technology and the Greater Human Good, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL & THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 303, 309 (2014) (recommending
programming restrictions and “mathematical proof” as a method for providing “safety and security
guarantees”).
305. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
306. E.g., Balkin, supra note 164 (advocating programming restrictions); Scherer, supra note 26,
at 393 (recommending “an agency tasked with certifying the safety of AI systems” and adjustments to
the liability system).
307. E.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 1 (naming organizations).
308. Council Directive 2015/849, art. 30(2), 2015 O.J. (L 141) 97, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/PNY4-W7GZ]
(“Member States shall require that the information referred to in paragraph 1 can be accessed in a timely
manner by competent authorities.”).
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not want to disclose their beneficial owners can simply incorporate in a
jurisdiction that does not require it.
Through FATF, the United States has agreed that “[c]ountries should
ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the
beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or
accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities.”309 Implementing
legislation has been pending in Congress for nearly a decade.
The proposed Corporate Transparency Act of 2017310 is minimalist and
would solve only part of the problem. The bill would require states to collect
beneficial ownership information, which would include only name, current
residential or business street address, and a unique identifying number from
an unexpired passport or driver’s license.311 It would not require applicants
to furnish copies of the passports or licenses or require the states to verify
the information. The states could delegate the collection to licensed entity
formation agents.312 The entities would be required to update the beneficial
owner information within 60 days after changes.313 The collected
information would be available only for law enforcement purposes and only
pursuant to formal processes.314
Despite its minimalism and safeguards, the bill has not gained political
traction. The most recent estimate of the bill’s passage (for the predecessor
bill in 2016) gave it a 1 percent chance.315 As a result of that failure, FATF
rates U.S. “measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons” to be
“inadequate.”316 “The U.S. legal framework has serious gaps that impede
effectiveness in this area.”317
Publicly, the bill’s opponents argue that requiring beneficial owner
identification will slow the incorporation process and make it more
expensive.318 But the vast majority of entities have only a single beneficial

309. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 43, at 22.
310. S. 1717, 115th Cong. § 3(b)(1)(A) (2017).
311. Id. § 3(b)(1)(A).
312. Id. § 3(b)(2).
313. Id. § 3(b)(1)(B)(i).
314. Id. § 3(b)(1)(D).
315. Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act (H.R. 4450), GOVTRACK,
(Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr4450 [https://perma.cc/3BHT-9GLF]
(estimating a 1 percent chance of passing).
316. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER-TERRORIST
FINANCING MEASURES MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: UNITED STATES 10 (2016), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-States-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JRS9LEE].
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 56 (“The secretaries of state, along with Delaware, argue that the
Levin measure would be costly and burdensome, and would discourage business incorporation and

950

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 95:887

owner. Rarely could there be more than three.319 Collecting the information
would have a negligible effect, if any, on the time a state would need to
process an incorporation.
The more likely explanation for the bill’s powerful opposition is that
many charter buyers are unwilling to disclose their status as beneficial
owners. Furnishing anonymous entities to the world market is a major
industry and the American states are the industry leaders. Enactment of the
bill would be the first step in killing that industry.
Enactment of the bill would be an important step toward the elimination
of anonymous entities, but more would be necessary. Enactment would
force AEs and criminals to furnish beneficial ownership information, but it
would not assure the information’s correctness. To assure correctness,
governments would have to collect identity documents and check them
against the records of their issuers. The FATF recommendation
contemplates that the governments conduct the verifications at the time the
entities are created.
To make effective use of the information, governments would also need
to assess the plausibility of claims to beneficial ownership. In doing so, the
investigators would be restricted by privacy laws and national borders.
The imposition of programming limitations on artificial general
intelligence may draw opposition independent of the opposition to entity
system reform. Programming limitations could, for example, impair the
effectiveness of algorithm-controlled weapons systems, thus affecting the
balance of military power. They could also impair the development of AGI
by limiting innovation. From the perspective of humanity as a whole, the
safer course would be to impose the limitations. But that is hardly a
sufficient condition to produce legislation.
The development of those limitations will undoubtedly be the subject of
political debate. If AEs exist and are profitable by that time, they would
probably have, under U.S. law, the constitutional right to participate in the
debate, and the practical ability to do so anonymously. In Citizens United,
the Supreme Court held that corporations have the constitutional right to
spend money to influence the outcomes of elections.320 In making that
decision, the Court expressed its understanding that the identities of the
spenders would be disclosed.321 But to date, the beneficial owners of the

capital formation.”).
319. To be a “beneficial owner” under the proposed legislation, the natural person would need to
exercise “substantial control” over the entity or have a “substantial interest in or receive substantial
economic benefits from” the entity. S. 1717, 115th Cong., at § 5333(d)(1)(A) (2017).
320. Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010).
321. Id. at 370 (“The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens
and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.”).
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contributed funds have managed to conceal their identities through multiple
layers of artificial entities.322 Although about eighty percent of Americans
have thought, almost since the decision was made in 2010, that it should be
reversed,323 no reversal is imminent. If Citizens United remains in effect
during the AE debate, AEs may themselves play a major role in the debate.
AEs may also gain legal traction from three other constitutional
doctrines. States may not enact laws that interfere with the free flow of
interstate commerce.324 Nor may they deny entities the equal protection of
their laws.325 Lastly, the United States Supreme Court has come perilously
close to declaring that the internal affairs doctrine is constitutionally
mandated, and the Delaware Supreme Court has held that it is
constitutionally mandated.326
Thus, it is not at all clear that the entity system can be fixed in time to
prevent the development of wealthy and powerful AEs. If it is not, the entity
system probably cannot be fixed at all.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
AEs are inevitable because they have three advantages over humancontrolled businesses. They can act and react more quickly, they don’t lose
accumulated knowledge through personnel changes, and they cannot be
held responsible for their wrongdoing in any meaningful way.
AEs constitute a threat to humanity because the only limits on their
conduct are the limits the least restrictive human creator imposes. As the
science advances, algorithms’ abilities will improve until they far exceed
those of humans. What remains to be determined is whether humans will be
successful in imposing controls before the opportunity to do so has passed.
This Article has addressed a previously unexplored aspect of the

322. E.g., CHISUN LEE ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, SECRET
SPENDING IN THE STATES 7 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/secret-spending-states
[https://perma.cc/CCP5-R3JP] (“In the states, dark money in 2014 was 38 times greater than in 2006,
while in federal elections it increased by 34 times over the same period.”); id. at 5 (reporting that political
action committees (PACs) “increasingly . . . have disclosed not individuals or businesses, whose interests
are relatively apparent, but rather other PACs”).
323. E.g., Americans Want Supreme Court to Turn Off Political Spending Spigot: Bloomberg Poll,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-28/bloomberg-pollamericans-want-supreme-court-to-turn-off-political-spending-spigot (“In a new Bloomberg Politics
national poll, 78 percent of those responding said the Citizens United ruling should be overturned,
compared with 17 percent who called it a good decision.”).
324. See supra note 167.
325. Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (noting that the Court agreed
that the Equal Protection Clause applied to corporations).
326. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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artificial-intelligence-control problem. Giving algorithms control of entities
endows algorithms with legal rights and gives them the ability to transact
anonymously with humans. Once granted, those rights and abilities would
be difficult to revoke. Under current law, algorithms could inhabit entities
of most types and nationalities. They could move from one type or
nationality to another, thereby changing their governing law. They could
easily hide from regulators in a system where the controllers of nonpublicly-traded entities are all invisible. Because the revocation of AEs’
rights and abilities would require the amendment of thousands of entity
laws, the entity system is less likely to function as a means of controlling
artificial intelligence than as a means by which artificial intelligence will
control humans.
Entity law is not only incapable of regulating AEs, it is incapable of
regulating much of anything. The entity system is grounded in three
principles. First, an entity can incorporate anywhere, regardless of the
location of its operations. Second, an entity chartered in one jurisdiction can
do business in virtually any other jurisdiction. Third, while operating in
those other jurisdictions, the entity continues to be governed by the entity
law under which it was formed. Together, those principles implicitly define
a regulatory competition through the sale of entity charters. Each
government competes for a share in billions of dollars of revenues annually
by promoting and selling its entities and the regulation that accompanies
them.
To regulate is to restrict. A competition to sell restrictions will, of course,
be won by the jurisdiction that provides the fewest. Thus, the natural
culmination of charter competition is a system that does not restrict at all.
That result is not unintended. It is essentially what Romano touted as the
“genius of American corporate law.”327 By embracing the charter
competition, the United States has become the world’s largest supplier of
anonymous entities and enabled its corporate service providers to achieve
the world’s lowest rate of compliance with the international standards
designed to prevent terrorist financing and money-laundering.328
Because they believed that government should not regulate the
relationship among the corporation and its officers, directors, and
shareholders, charter competition advocates have perpetuated a system that
hardly regulates at all. What the advocates apparently failed to realize is that
entity law applies to much more than the entities’ internal affairs. AEs have

327. See supra note 2.
328. Baradaran, supra note 79, at 521 (table showing the U.S. corporate service providers to have
the lowest rate of compliance with the requirement for notarized photo identification to form and entity).
Within the United States, Delaware has the lowest rate of compliance. Id. at 526 (table).
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no internal affairs, yet entity law will govern the key issues that determine
their viability.
Chartering governments decide who—or what—can have the rights of a
person by acting through an entity. Chartering governments also decide
what information about the human actors will be available to the public,
what information will be available to police and prosecutors, how quickly
that information will be made available and at what expense, how quickly
and easily an entity can flee a jurisdiction to avoid the jurisdiction’s current
or proposed regulations, and even whether a tort creditor can recover against
an entity’s owner. Chartering governments decide these issues even when
the effects are felt entirely outside the chartering jurisdiction.
The AE threat dramatically illustrates the fundamental weakness of
regulatory competition as a policy tool. Once the charter competition was
up and running, the economic, political, and legal systems adjusted. Ending
the competition now would be so disruptive it is almost impossible. The
entity system is not merely a system that will not regulate when regulation
is not needed, it is a system that cannot regulate even when regulation is
needed.
The assertion that charter competition is harmless because entity law
governs only entities’ internal affairs is no longer plausible. As the example
of AEs illustrates, entity law governs far more than the internal affairs of a
corporation. It determines the very nature of the corporate personality. The
survival of the human race may depend on recognition of that fact.

